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ABSTRACT 
The protection of the Turkish Straits against maritime terrorism is an important security 
problem that must be solved because the straits are highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks. 
The main purpose of this research is to increase the security of the Turkish Straits against 
maritime terrorism by designing an underwater system that can stop a terrorist ship by 
impeding its propeller efficiency. The underwater system wraps ropes and nets around 
the propeller and its hub, decreasing the propeller efficiency. First, the most probable 
scenario from the point of view of a terrorist organization is determined. Second, all the 
existing and some non-existent methods to prevent this scenario are analyzed. Finally, an 
underwater system is designed to impede the propeller efficiency of a ship by wrapping 
ropes and nets around the propeller and its hub in order to stop the ship before entering 
the strait. Experimental results of previous researchers and computational methods are 
used to demonstrate the loss of propeller efficiency after wrapping. 
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The protection of the Turkish Straits against maritime terrorism is an important 
security problem that must be solved because the straits are highly vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks. It is relatively easy to execute a terrorist attack in the straits because of the 
intense maritime traffic, narrow geographical configurations and high population density. 
Terrorists do not need a large amount of explosives because the cargo of Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG), Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and other chemical cargo carrier 
ships is itself highly explosive. An explosion in the straits may cause the loss of 
thousands of lives, an environmental catastrophe, closure of the straits for navigation and 
an economic crisis. Therefore, the straits are high value targets from the point of view of 
terrorist organizations.  
The USS Cole, the crude oil tanker Limburg and the SuperFerry-14 incidents 
demonstrate the ability of terrorists to execute maritime terrorism. During this research, 
the Kartepe ferry was hijacked in the Gulf of Izmit, Turkey. There are high value targets 
in and around the Gulf of Izmit: the main base of the Turkish Navy, the shore refinery of 
the Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation (TUPRAS) and the Istanbul Strait, which 
is just 40 NM away from the gulf. This recent incident demonstrates the threat of 
maritime terrorism in Turkey. Furthermore, the success of piracy attacks may encourage 
terrorist organizations to execute maritime terrorism.   
Currently, there are lots of academic papers, technical reports and newspaper 
articles about the vulnerability of the Turkish Straits to maritime accidents and dangerous 
cargo carrier ship explosions. This research aims to go one step further and develop a 
solution for preventing maritime terrorism in the straits. In this study first the most 
probable scenario from the point of view of a terrorist organization is determined. 
Second, all the existing and some non-existent methods to prevent this scenario are  
 2
analyzed. Finally, an underwater system is designed to impede the propeller efficiency of 
a ship by wrapping ropes and nets around the propeller and its hub in order to stop the 
ship before entering the strait. 
B. PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
The main purpose of this research is to design an underwater system that provides 
an additional security to the Turkish Straits against maritime terrorism. The proposed 
security design targets the propeller and hub of the terrorist ship by wrapping ropes and 
nets. The ropes and nets are carried to the propeller and hub by unmanned underwater 
vehicles (UUVs), which are released from the hidden underwater structure operated with 
a remote control system. With such an underwater system, it is desired to impede the 
propeller efficiency and stop the terrorist ship before it enters the straits and prevent a 
possible further damage it may cause. This research followed these steps: 
 Demonstrate the vulnerability of the Turkish Straits to maritime terrorism; 
 Analyze the effects of a possible LNG, LPG or other chemical material 
explosion in the Turkish Straits; 
 Determine the most probable maritime terrorism scenario in the straits; 
 Analyze the existing methods of protection against the most probable 
scenario; 
 Analyze the feasibility and applicability of currently non-existent methods 
of protection against the most probable scenario; 
 Decide the most feasible and applicable method of protection against the 
terrorist ship in the most probable scenario; 




 Demonstrate the usefulness and benefits of the most feasible and 
applicable method by using computational methods and experimental 
results; 
 Design a new system in order to apply the most feasible and applicable 
method. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To decide the most feasible and applicable method of protection against the 
terrorist ship in the most probable scenario (the underwater system designed to stop the 
terrorist ship’s propeller by impeding propeller efficiency), this research addresses the 
following questions:  
 What are the possible effects (social, economic and environmental) of 
executing maritime terrorism in the Turkish Straits? 
 What are the shipping traffic statistics of the straits? 
 What are the most explosive and dangerous cargos that are transported 
through the straits? 
 What are the statistics, types and effects of LNG, LPG or other dangerous 
cargo explosions?  
 What are the world’s piracy statistics? 
 Will the success of piracy encourage terrorist organizations to execute 
maritime terrorism attacks? 
 What are some well-known maritime terrorism incidents? 
 What are the possible methods of executing maritime terrorism? 
 What are the existing methods of preventing maritime terrorism? 
 What are some currently non-existent methods of preventing maritime 
terrorism? 
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 Which strait (Istanbul or Canakkale) is the most probable location of the 
terrorist attack?  
 What are the most preferable cargo carrier ships for the terrorists to be 
used in an attack to straits?  
 Which method will probably be used by terrorists to execute the terrorist 
attack?  
 What is the most probable maritime terrorism scenario in the straits? 
 What are the characteristics of the sample ship that will be used in the 
scenario? 
 Is it possible to protect the straits from the most probable terrorist attack 
by using currently existing methods?  
 Are currently non-existing methods feasible and applicable for the most 
probable scenario? 
In order to design the underwater system, this research seeks to answer the 
questions: 
 What are the effects of wrapping ropes and nets around the propeller and 
its hub? 
 What are the effects of increasing hub diameter, propeller blade area, 
thickness, roughness, resistance and weight on propeller efficiency?  
 Are there computational methods to demonstrate the success of the 
underwater system? 
 Are there experimental methods to demonstrate the success of the 
underwater system? 
 What are the main components of the underwater system? 
 What are the probable motions of the ship after wrapping?  
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D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The proposed underwater system is designed based on the most feasible and 
applicable method of protection: to impede propeller efficiency in order to stop the 
terrorist ship. This method is selected to prevent the most probable maritime terrorism 
scenario from the point of view of terrorist organizations. Therefore, easily accessible 
(non-confidential) statistics and information are used for the selection process of the most 
probable scenario. For this reason, almost all references in Chapters II, III, IV and V are 
Internet based. 
As studied in Chapter VI, the hub diameter, propeller blade thickness, blade area, 
roughness and appendage resistance will be increased after the successful wrapping of 
ropes and nets around the propeller and its hub. All these factors decrease the efficiency 
of the ship’s propeller. Since there was no opportunity to conduct experiments in this 
research, OpenProp v2.4.6 software was used to calculate the efficiency loss due to the 
increase of hub diameter after wrapping. The efficiency loss caused by the other factors 
(i.e., an increase of the propeller blade thickness, blade area, roughness and appendage 
resistance) also can be calculated by using computational methods (despite the random 
nature of the wrapping). On the other hand, because of time limitations, a computational 
method could not be used to calculate the efficiency loss due to these factors. Therefore, 
experimental results of other researchers about propeller efficiency calculations are used 
to demonstrate the loss of efficiency due to these factors. 
The main components of the underwater system are UUVs, a command and 
control station, acoustic sensors, an artificial reef, waterproof tanks, and the ropes and 
nets to wrap around the propeller. The functions of these components and the probable 
motions of the terrorist ship after wrapping are described in Chapter VII. On the other 
hand, the power requirements, weight and strength calculations, acoustics, underwater 
positioning methods, wrapping mechanism and the material selection are not studied 
because of time limitations of this research.      
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E. BENEFIT OF THE RESEARCH 
The benefit of the research may be separated into two parts:  
 The information and analyses that are included in the research,  
 The application of the underwater system that is designed to stop a 
terrorist ship by wrapping ropes and nets around the propeller and its hub. 
1. Information and Analyses  
The decision process of the most probable maritime terrorism scenario contains 
lots of statistical and historical data about the Turkish Straits, their shipping traffic, 
maritime terrorism incidents, piracy, LNG, LPG and other chemical cargo explosions, 
methods of executing maritime terrorism and existing and non-existent methods of 
preventing maritime terrorism. On the other hand, the solution process against this 
scenario contains computational and experimental results about calculating the loss of 
propeller efficiency in order to stop a ship under control of the terrorists. All this 
information may be useful for researchers and organizations that are interested in 
preventing maritime terrorism and calculating the loss of propeller efficiency. 
2. The Application of the Underwater System 
Should it be deployed, this system can be used both in peace and wartime. The 
Turkish Navy and Coast Guard Commands can use and benefit from the underwater 
system.  
a. Peace Time 
The main purpose of the underwater system is to prevent a maritime 
terrorist attack by stopping a ship that is under the control of terrorists. If the system 
works properly, there will be a significant propeller efficiency loss, and the ship will be 
stopped before entering the strait. The Turkish Navy and Coast Guard Commands have 
boarding teams that can execute an operation to take control of the ship from the 
terrorists. On the other hand, an unsuccessful boarding leaves no time for a second 
operation; or the arrival of late intelligence about a terrorist ship already close to the 
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entrance of the strait, there is currently no way to stop the ship. The authorities must have 
alternative methods besides boarding. Finally, boarding is not a guaranteed solution, so 
the underwater system will provide an alternative solution. 
Second, the underwater system will provide a non-lethal solution to 
maritime terrorism attacks with ships. In this way, it will be possible to stop the ship 
without using any kind of weapons. Using weapons may cause explosions, damage and 
sinking of the terrorist ship with the loss of lives and an environmental catastrophe. 
Third, if a terrorist organization has information or intelligence about this 
underwater system, they will probably change their minds about the method of attack. 
The terrorists may decide to not use an explosive cargo carrier ship. Therefore, a possible 
method of executing maritime terrorism will be eliminated. 
The underwater system also can be used to protect shore facilities and 
harbors against maritime terrorism. Finally, the artificial reef part of the underwater 
system can serve as a home to fish for many years and contribute to the sustainable 
fishing industry. 
b. Wartime 
The underwater system can be used to stop enemy warships. The system 
may force an enemy to spend extra time and effort. Besides, it may serve as a deterrent to 
enemy forces, forcing them to change their plans or quit their mission. Also, the system 
may create a surprise effect (similar to sea mines) and reverse the tactical situation to the 
advantage of the other side. Even if enemy has intelligence about the underwater system, 
the ambiguity of the position information negatively affects the enemy’s operation.  
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II. TURKISH STRAITS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The Republic of Turkey is located where Europe, Asia and Africa are closest to 
each other. Turkey is bordered by eight countries: Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The country has a unique geostrategic importance at the 
center of the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea.   
 
Figure 1.   Location of Turkey (From [1]) 
Turkey was the world’s eighteenth most crowded country with the population of 
74.7 million people at the end of the year 2011. Turkey also had the world’s eighteenth 
largest economy based on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2011 [2], [3], [4].   
Turkey is not only a cultural but an energy bridge between Europe and Asia. The 
importance of Turkey increases simultaneously with European countries’ increasing 
dependency on Caspian and Middle Eastern oil and gas. The Turkish Straits are a key 
passage in the energy routes. 
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The Turkish Straits are located in the northwestern part of Turkey and separate 
Europe and Asia. The Istanbul Strait (also known as the Bosphorus), Canakkale Strait 
(also known as the Dardanelles) and the Sea of Marmara generate the 164-nautical-mile 
(NM)-long Turkish Strait system. The Istanbul Strait connects the Black Sea to the Sea of 
Marmara, and the Canakkale Strait connects the Sea of Marmara to the Aegean and 
Mediterranean Seas [5].   
 
Figure 2.   Turkish Strait System (From [5], [6]) 
B. ISTANBUL STRAIT 
The Istanbul Strait is a 17-NM-long waterway between the Black Sea and the Sea 
of Marmara. It is the narrowest natural waterway used for international navigation with 
an average width of 0.81 NM. The strait has a maximum width of 1.85 NM and a 
minimum width of 0.38 NM. The width of the strait is 1.798 NM at the northern entrance 
and 1.526 NM at the southern entrance [7], [8]. 
The average depth of the strait is 65 meters in the shipping traffic route. The depth 
varies from 36 to 124 meters, the greatest depth located in the midstream of the strait [7]. 
There are north-to-south surface currents and south-to-north undercurrents in the  
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strait due to the density difference between the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara. The 
surface current speed is up to 4 knots in the strait. The peak current speed may reach 7-8 
knots in narrow sections [7], [9]. 
The strait had minimum and maximum sea temperatures of 7.1 and 26.3oC 
(Celsius) in 2010. The salinity of the strait varies from 16 to 22 ppt (parts per thousand) 
[10], [11].  
 
Figure 3.   Istanbul Strait  (From [5]) 
The strait divides the city of Istanbul, the most crowded city of Turkey, into two 
halves. There were 13,624,240 people living in Istanbul at the end of 2011 (18.2% of 
Turkey’s population) [2].   
Istanbul is the economic center of Turkey, producing 27% of the national gross 
domestic product (GDP) and 38% of the total industrial output [12]. 
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C. CANAKKALE STRAIT 
The Canakkale Strait, a 37-NM-long waterway between the Sea of Marmara and 
the Aegean Sea, is a natural waterway used for international navigation.  The width of the 
strait varies from 0.75 to 3.7 NM, and its average depth is 55 meters. Just like the 
Istanbul Strait, there is a surface current from north-to-south and an opposite 
undercurrent from south-to-north. The surface current speed exceeds 3.5 knots in some 
regions [13], [14], [15].   
The strait had minimum and maximum sea temperatures of 8 to 26.2oC (Celsius) 
in 2010. The salinity of the strait varies from 22.7 to 39.1 ppt [10], [16]. 
Located beside the strait, the city of Canakkale had a total population of 486,445 
people at the end of 2011 [17]. The economy depends on agriculture and the fishing 
industry. 
 
Figure 4.   Canakkale Strait (From [13]) 
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D. MARITIME TRAFFIC STATISTICS 
The Turkish Straits are the only waterway that accesses the Black Sea and Central 
Asian countries. The annual average number of the ships passing through the Turkish 
Straits is 50,000 [18], [19]. The straits are one of the busiest chokepoints of the world. 
Table 1.   Global Shipping Chokepoints Comparison (From [18]) 
 
Table 2.   Shipping Traffic Statistics of Istanbul Strait (After [19]) 
Chokepoint/Critical Routes Traffic (Number of Ships/Year) 
Volume 
(Containers/Year) 
Strait of Malacca 50,000 30,500,000 
Turkish Straits  50,000 14,625,000 
Strait of Hormuz 25,455 9,545,455 
Suez Canal 16,000 9,900,000 
Panama Canal 13,000 9,495,455 
Bab el-Mandab 3,920 840,000 
Russian Oil and Gas Ports 2,545 1,145,455 
Shipping Traffic Statistics of Istanbul Strait (Last 15 Years) 
Year Total Number  of Ships 
200 Meters 500 Gross Ton 
Less Greater Less Greater 
1997 50,942 44,455 6,487 5,087 45,855 
1998 49,304 47,361 1,943 4,475 44,829 
1999 47,906 45,738 2,168 3,552 44,354 
2000 48,079 45,876 2,203 3,345 44,734 
2001 42,637 40,184 2,453 2,155 40,482 
2002 47,283 44,170 3,113 1,932 45,350 
2003 46,939 44,016 2,923 1,782 45,157 
2004 54,564 51,512 3,052 2,107 52,457 
2005 54,794 51,291 3,503 1,610 53,184 
2006 54,880 51,227 3,653 2,176 52,704 
2007 56,606 52,953 3,653 2,138 54,468 
2008 54,396 50,485 3,911 1,800 52,596 
2009 51,422 47,551 3,871 1,128 50,294 
2010 50,871 47,248 3,623 1,377 49,494 
2011 49,798 45,998 3,800 1,046 48,752 
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Table 3.   Shipping Traffic Statistics of Canakkale Strait (After [19]) 
The dense marine traffic of the straits increases the risk of maritime accidents that 
could threaten public safety. Strong surface currents and the sinusoidal shape of the 
straits, with sharp turns, are other characteristics that heighten this risk. There have been 
serious accidents in the history of the straits. The worst scenario today is an accident 
involving a ship carrying hazardous cargo. 
An accident in the straits may cause: 
 Loss of thousands of lives,  
 An environmental catastrophe, 
 The closure of the straits for navigation, 
 An economic crisis. 
Shipping Traffic Statistics of Canakkale Strait (Last 15 Years) 
Year Total Number  of Ships 
200 Meters 500 Gross Ton 
Less Greater Less Greater 
1997 36,543 28,032 8,511 1,117 35,426 
1998 38,777 36,383 2,394 1,482 37,295 
1999 40,582 38,014 2,568 1,492 39,090 
2000 41,561 38,864 2,697 1,398 40,163 
2001 39,249 34,489 2,960 936 38,316 
2002 42,669 39,004 3,665 689 41,980 
2003 42,648 38,925 3,723 677 41,971 
2004 48,421 44,052 3,919 1,327 47,094 
2005 49,077 44,585 4,492 1,211 47,866 
2006 48,915 44,070 4,845 1,404 47,511 
2007 49,913 44,968 4,945 1,873 48,040 
2008 48,978 43,755 5,223 844 48,134 
2009 49,453 44,277 5,176 615 48,838 
2010 46,686 41,588 5,098 598 46,088 
2011 45,379 39,885 5,494 572 44,807 
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There is a dense marine traffic of hazardous/dangerous cargo carrier ships in the 
straits. These types of ship carry liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), crude oil and oil 
products between the Black Sea littoral countries and Turkey, Europe, North Africa and 
the Americas. They carry liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Algeria and Nigeria to 
Turkey. Other flammable and explosive chemical materials like ethylene, propylene, and 
ammonium nitrate are transported through the straits.     
 
Figure 5.   Tanker Traffic Statistics of The Turkish Straits (After [19]) 
E. MARITIME TERRORISM IN TURKISH STRAITS 
The dense marine traffic of flammable and explosive cargo carrier ships and the 
possibly catastrophic effects of an explosion in the straits would have on public safety, 
the environment and the world economy may attract the attention of a terrorist 
organization. One of the main reasons the straits attract attention is the fact that there is 
no need for a large amount of explosives to carry out an attack. Terrorists do not need a 
large amount of explosives because the ship’s cargo, itself, is highly volatile. Even 
without explosives, these types of ship become a weapon in case of collision. In 
conclusion, maritime terrorism using LNG, LPG or other flammable or explosive cargo  
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carrier ships is respectively easy and preferable to execute, and it threatens catastrophic 
results. Therefore, protection of the straits against maritime terrorism is an important 
security problem. 
Another explosive/weapon that can be used in a maritime terrorism scenario is the 
so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD): chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear (CBRN) weapons. WMD can be carried by any type of vessel and then exploded 
in the Turkish Straits. WMD are not as easily accessible as conventional explosives, and 
there is an international effort to prevent their use. Obtaining and using WMD requires a 
high level of knowledge and experience for a terrorist organization. For all these reasons, 
this method probably will not be the first choice of terrorists. Therefore, preventing 
WMD attacks are not directly analyzed in this research. 
Protection against terrorism mainly depends on intelligence. With such 
intelligence, authorities must take actions to prevent terrorist attacks. The purpose of this 
research is to improve the capabilities of the Turkish Navy and Coast Guard Commands 
against maritime terrorism. In this study, the main threat and concern is the LNG, LPG or 
other flammable/explosive cargo carrier ships. Methods of stopping these ships under the 
control of terrorists are analyzed in a very detailed manner in this research to improve 
these capabilities. These methods are also applicable for stopping ships loaded with 
WMD.       
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III. MARITIME TERRORISM 
A. FROM PIRACY TO MARITIME TERRORISM 
Piracy is an important threat to maritime shipping industry. Shipping routes close 
to unpopulated shores have a high risk of piracy. Africa and South East Asia, especially, 
have dangerous waters for piracy. Somali pirates conducted 44 successful ship hijackings 
out of a global total of 48 in 2010 [20].  
Table 4.   World’s Piracy Statistics (After [21]) 
The number of pirate attacks in Africa has increased in recent years.  
Table 5.   World’s Regional Piracy Statistics (After [21]) 
Basically, a pirate attack may have three results. The crew may lose their lives, 
shipping companies may lose money and the world’s economy may be negatively 
affected. The cost of maritime piracy to the world’s economy is estimated to be from 7 to 
12 billion USD (U.S. dollars) per year. Ransoms, insurance, re-routing, and security 
compose the main parts of this cost [20]. 
Total number of ships attacked, January to December 1995-2010 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
188 228 248 202 300 469 335 370 445 329 276 239 263 293 410 445 
Regional number of ships attacked, January to December 2005-2010 
Year Total South East Asia Far East
Indian 




2005 276 102 20 36 25 80 13 
2006 239 83 5 53 29 61 8 
2007 263 70 10 30 21 120 12 
2008 293 54 11 23 14 189 2 
2009 410 46 23 30 37 266 8 
2010 445 70 44 28 40 259 4 
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Successful attacks by pirates may encourage terrorist organizations to conduct 
maritime terrorism. Six conditions may attract the attention of terrorist organizations to 
maritime terrorism: 
 The significant effect of maritime terrorism to public safety, the 
environment, and economy, 
 The current number of successful ship hijackings,  
 The relatively slow speed of commercial ships, 
 The relatively large bodies of commercial ships, 
 The large number of unprotected, cruising commercial ships, 
 The easy availability of intelligence (Terrorists can easily find the real 
time positions of commercial ships by checking Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) websites, for example http://www.marinetraffic.com/ais/) 
The main physical targets of maritime terrorism are military and commercial 
ships, mega-cities and harbors, maritime platforms and shore facilities.  
These are the well-known maritime terrorism incidents:  
1. The USS Cole Incident 
Terrorists executed a suicide attack on the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole on 
October 12, 2000, while she was in the port of Aden. They used a small boat loaded with 
explosives. Seventeen crew members were killed, and 39 were injured [22].    
  
Figure 6.   After Suicide Attack to USS Cole (From [23], [24]) 
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2. Crude Oil Tanker Limburg Incident 
The double hull crude oil tanker Limburg was rammed by a fast small boat in 
2002 in the Gulf of Aden. The small boat was loaded with explosives. Double hull 
construction prevented the sinking of the tanker. One crew member was killed, and 
12 crew members were injured. Almost 90,000 barrels of oil were spilled [22].  
 
Figure 7.   After Suicide Attack on to Supertanker Limburg (From [25], [26]) 
3. SuperFerry-14 Bombing Incident 
Terrorists placed a television set containing a TNT bomb on board the 
SuperFerry-14 on the 27th of February, 2004. The explosion occurred during the ship’s 
cruise in Manila Bay, Philippines. One hundred sixteen people were killed. This is the 
world’s deadliest maritime terrorist attack [27]. 
 
Figure 8.   After Bombing of Superferry-14 (From [28], [29]) 
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4. Kartepe Ferry Incident 
During this research, a terrorist organization named the Kurdish Workers’ Party 
(PKK) executed a maritime terrorism activity in Turkey. This is the first maritime 
terrorism attempt by the PKK. In the Gulf of Izmit in November 2011, a terrorist hijacked 
a ferry with 18 passengers and 6 crew members on board. The terrorist was a suicide 
bomber wearing a bomb vest [30].   
 
Figure 9.   Gulf of Izmit (After [30]) 
There are high value targets in and around the Gulf of Izmit, any of which might 
have been targets of the terrorists. Golcuk, the main base of the Turkish Navy, is in the 
gulf, and the Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation (TUPRAS) has the biggest shore 
refinery of Turkey in that area. The Istanbul Strait is just 40 NM away from the gulf.  
The Turkish Navy and Coast Guard Commands conducted the counter-operation 
together. A seal team of the Turkish Navy boarded the ferry 12 hours into the hijacking 
and killed the terrorist before he activated the explosives.   
 
Figure 10.   Kartepe,  the Hijacked Ferry (From [30]) 
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B. POSSIBLE METHODS OF EXECUTING MARITIME TERRORISM 
The USS Cole, the crude oil tanker Limburg, the Superferry-14, and the Kartepe 
ferry incidents demonstrate the threat of maritime terrorism. There are a number of ways 
to execute a terrorist attack to cause an explosion on or take control of a target ship. The 
U.S. Government Accountability Office’s “Maritime Security Report” is used to 
construct the main body of possible methods of executing maritime terrorism [31].  
1. Attacks by other Vehicles   
Terrorists can use explosive-loaded small vehicles to conduct this type of attack. 
WMD also can be loaded in the vehicles. The type of cargo carried by the target ship (for 
example, LNG or LPG), the characteristic of the explosives and payload of the small boat 
mainly determines the results of the attack.  
There has been great progress in unmanned aerial, surface and underwater vehicle 
technologies in recent years. Even though these vehicles have payload limitations today, 
they can be used for terrorist attacks in the near future.  
Basically, there are three types of vehicles that can be used in these attacks. 
a. Small Boat Attack 
Terrorists may use both remotely operated and crewed (suicide attack) 
small boats for attacks. Today, there are different types of unmanned surface vehicles 
(USVs) which are in use for military applications.  
 
Figure 11.   Manned and Unmanned Small Boats (From [32], [33]) 
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b. Small Aircraft Attack 
Terrorists may use explosive-laden small aircraft. Both remotely operated 
and crewed (suicide attack) small aircraft can be used. Today, there are different types of 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in use for various applications. 
    
Figure 12.   Manned and Unmanned Small Aircraft (From [34], [35]) 
c. Small Underwater Vehicle Attack 
Terrorists may use explosive-loaded small underwater vehicles. Both 
remotely operated and crewed (suicide attack) small underwater vehicles can be used. 
Today, there are different types of crewed small submarines and unmanned underwater 
vehicles (UUVs) which are in use for various applications. 
 
Figure 13.   Manned and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (From [36], [37]) 
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2. Shoulder-Fired Missile Attack  
Using shoulder-fired missiles is another method of executing maritime terrorism. 
These missiles can be launched both from land and boats. Narrow straits like the Strait of 
Malacca and the Turkish Straits are highly vulnerable to this type of attack. If the missile 
hits the bridge-deck of the target ship during its passage through the narrow strait, it may 
cause a collision or grounding. On the other hand, if the target ship has dangerous cargo, 
these missiles may cause a strong explosion.  
    
Figure 14.   Example of a Shoulder-fired Anti-armor Missile (From [38]) 
3. Hijacking 
Terrorists may use small boats or helicopters for boarding the target ships, 
afterwards taking control of the ships by using weapons. Subsequent to the successful 
hijacking, they will have two options: colliding with another ship, platform or shore 
facility, or cause an explosion using explosives.  
4. Crew Conspiracy 
Preventing terrorists from boarding the target ship is not an absolute solution. 
Some of the crew may be members of a terrorist organization, and they may take control 
of the ship. Similar to the hijacking scenario, they will have two options: collide with 
another ship, platform or shore facility, or cause an explosion by using explosives.  
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5. Mines and Controlled Bombs 
Terrorists may use harbor mines, remotely controlled bombs or time bombs to 
damage the target ship. These bombs can be activated during the cruise of the ship. 
6. Divers/Swimmers 
Underwater attack by divers is a possible method, if the target ship is not cruising. 
C. METHODS FOR PREVENTING MARITIME TERRORISM 
The main body of preventative methods to terrorist attack is based on C.D. Epp’s 
thesis [39]. 
1. Existing Methods to Prevent a Terrorist Attack to a Target Ship or 
Take Control of the Ship from the Terrorists 
a. Escorting the Ships while Cruising in Critical Waters  
Escorting ships is an effective solution to prevent small boat attacks and 
boarding by terrorists. Today, the Coast Guard and Naval forces escort ships cruising in 
critical territorial waters, especially in the straits and entrance to harbors. NATO 
Maritime Group’s mission against piracy in Somali is a well-known example of escorting 
in international waters.  
b. Patrolling around Maritime Platforms and Shore Facilities  
The Coast Guard has a mission of patrolling the water of important 
maritime platforms and shore facilities. This method prevents small boat attacks against 
these platforms and facilities.  
c. Using Non-Lethal Weapons  
The crew of the ship may use an electric fence, fire nozzle with 
pressurized water, optical laser distracter (a dazzle gun), Long Range Acoustic Device 
(LRAD) and other types of non-lethal weapons to prevent boarding by terrorists.  
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d. Stopping the Propeller of a Small Boat  
Currently, there are two different systems to stop the propellers of small 
boats. These systems have size limitations.  
(1)  Boat Trap. The U.S. Coast Guard is using a non-lethal system 
called the “boat trap.” The principle of the system is using ballistic nets dropped from 
helicopters to wrap the propeller of the terrorist boat. The system was tested many times 
in 2005 and stopped 100% of small boat targets [40]. This is an effective method against 
both maritime terrorism and piracy. 
   
Figure 15.   Deploying of Boat Trap from Coast Guard Helicopter (From [41]) 
    
Figure 16.   Boat Trap: before and after Wrapping (From [41, 42]) 
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(2)  Pirate Trap (P-trap). This method protects cruising ships 
against piracy boarding. The system carries thin lines around the ship on both sides and at 
the stern and is suspended by booms. These thin lines float at the waterline. Whenever a 
small boat gets into this protected area, these lines wrap around the propeller, stop the 
boat, and prevent boarding [43].  
   
Figure 17.   P-trap Application (From [43]) 
e. Using Scanning Devices to Find the Terrorists and Bombs  
The control of containers while a ship is at port may prevent a possible 
attack. There are different types of devices to detect nuclear and dirty bombs. A dirty 
bomb is the combination of conventional explosives and radioactive materials. 
f. Early Detection Systems   
Using infrared camera systems, audio detection and other types of sensors 
may prevent a possible attack. 
g. Having Security Teams on Board Commercial Ships  
Having a professional security team on board increases the security of the 
ship above the level maintained by the crew alone. 
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h. Boarding 
In most countries, the Coast Guard and Navy have special boarding teams 
trained to execute boarding operations on hijacked ships and take control of the ship from 
the terrorists. Currently, this is the only way to take control of ships without damaging 
them. Boarding teams can be deployed either from helicopters or small boats.   
i. Gunfire by Warships, Aircrafts, or Land-Based Platforms 
The hijacked ship can be attacked externally. However, applying this 
method is dangerous to the hijacked dangerous cargo ships. Gunfire may cause an 
explosion and lethal consequences, including an environmental catastrophe. Therefore, 
this method is inapplicable in some cases or places, like crowded straits and ports. On the 
other hand, these results are acceptable if compared with the death of thousands of 
innocent people.  
j. Barriers  
Using barriers is an effective solution in narrow straits and the seaward 
entrances of shore facilities. These barriers may easily prevent small boat attacks. As an 
example, Whisprwave’s Vessel Exclusion Barrier (VEB) is able to completely stop a 35-
foot (10.67 meters) vessel traveling at a speed of 43.5 knots [44]. This method has begun 
to play an important role in port security. However, the method has limitations: It is 
impossible to stop larger attack boats and cannot be used to protect ships.   
  
Figure 18.   Barriers for Stopping Small Boat Attacks (From [44]) 
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k. Tugboats 
Using high powered tugboats can be an effective solution against light 
displacement terrorist ships and boats. Tugboats may change the course of a ship.  
 
Figure 19.   A Typical Tugboat (From [45]) 
2. Currently Non-Existent Methods to Prevent a Terrorist Attack on a 
Target Ship or Take Control of the Ship from the Terrorists  
a. Stopping the Propeller 
Rope, wire, and/or nets can be wrapped around the terrorist ship’s 
propeller. In this way, the propeller can be stopped, or at least the propeller’s thrust and 
efficiency can be decreased. As mentioned before, the U.S. Coast Guard is using a system 
to stop a small boat’s propeller [41]. This system has size limitations. Currently, there is 
no system to stop a larger ship’s propeller.  
b. Damaging the Propeller 
Currently, there is no system to damage a ship’s propeller. Even in the 
future, this method will have a restricted application because damaging the propeller may 
cause a hole in the hull of the ship, causing the ship to lose buoyancy. Uncontrolled 
damage may result in the sinking of the ship. 
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Figure 20.   Propeller and Rudder of a Ship (From [46]) 
c. Impeding Steering by Damaging the Rudder 
Currently, there is no system to impede the steering of a terrorist ship. 
Similar to the situation with a propeller, damaging the rudder may cause a hole in the hull 
of the ship. Therefore, the ship may lose buoyancy. Uncontrolled damage may result in 
the sinking of the ship. On the other hand, beyond traditional rudders and propellers, 
there are new systems that control ship course and propulsion, like the Azimuth Thruster. 
In this system, rudder and propeller are combined. There is no separate rudder.    
 
Figure 21.   Combined Propeller and Rudder (From [47]) 
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d. Stopping the Engines by Interrupting the Air Flow  
Currently, there is no system to interrupt air flow to the engines. In the 
future, interrupting air flow to the ship’s engines is a possible solution to stop the engines 
of a terrorist ship.  
e. Restricting Visibility  
Currently, there is no system to restrict the visibility of a terrorist ship. 
f. Damaging all the Electronic Systems of the Ship by Non-Nuclear 
Electromagnetic Pulse (NNEMP)  
An NNEMP weapon may damage electronic systems and devices of a 
ship. “The effect of small e-bombs has proven to be sufficient for certain terrorists or 
military operations. Examples of such operations include the destruction of certain fragile 
electronic control systems of the type critical to the operation of many ground vehicles 
and aircraft” [48]. Currently, there is no NNEMP weapon for damaging the electronic 
devices of a terrorist ship.  
g. Changing the Course of the Ship by Underwater Explosions  
Changing the course of the terrorist ship may prevent a collision. This 
method will be useful to protect critical maritime platforms, harbor entrances and shore 
facilities. Currently, there is no underwater explosion system for changing the course of 
terrorist ships to prevent collusion.  
h. Clogging the Seawater Inlets of the Engine’s Cooling System   
Generally, lubrication oil is cooled by freshwater, and the freshwater is 
cooled by seawater in marine engines. Inlets for the seawater are located on the 
underwater hull of the ships. Clogging the seawater inlets will raise temperatures in the 
engines, forcing the engine to stop. Currently, there is no system for clogging the 
seawater inlets of the cooling system of a marine engine.   
 31
i. Remotely Controlled Signals to Stop the Ship’s Engines   
Today, almost all marine engines have electronic command and control 
systems. If a marine engine manufacturer designs an engine that can be stopped by a 
remotely controlled signal, it will be easy to stop the ship. Currently, there is no system 
for stopping an engine by remotely controlled signals.    
3. Summary of the Methods for Preventing Maritime Terrorism 
Preventative Methods Existing Non-Existent 
Escorting the Ships While Cruising In  
Critical Waters X - 
Patrolling around the Important Maritime  
Platforms and Shore Facilities X - 
Using Non-Lethal Weapons X - 
Stopping the Propeller of a Small Boat X - 
Using Scanning Devices to Find the  
Terrorists and Bombs  X - 
Early Detection Systems   X - 
Having Security Teams on Board of the  
Commercial Ships  X - 
Barriers  X - 
Boarding X - 
Gunfire X - 
Tugboats X - 
Stopping the Propeller - X 
Damaging the Propeller - X 
Damaging the Rudder - X 
Interrupting Air Flow - X 
Restricting Visibility - X 
NNEMP - X 
Underwater Explosions - X 
Clogging the Seawater Inlets - X 
Remotely Controlled Signals  - X 
Table 6.   Summary of the Methods for Preventing Maritime Terrorism 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF LNG, LPG AND OTHER DANGEROUS 
CARGO   
A. OVERVIEW 
The characteristics and hazards of the LNG, LPG and other flammable/explosive 
cargo are analyzed in this chapter. Based on this analysis, the next chapter will seek to 
answer two basic questions: Are tankers that carry LNG, LPG and other such chemicals 
and that pass through the Turkish Straits attractive targets for terrorists? If they are, 
which are the best targets from terrorists’ point of view?   
The number of pirate attacks has increased in recent years. The success of piracy 
may boost maritime terrorism. Pirates hijack ships for ransom, but if terrorists hijack 
explosive cargo ships, the results will probably be catastrophic.  
Table 7.   Hazardous/Dangerous Cargo Ships Piracy Statistics (After [21]) 
Number of Hazardous/Dangerous Cargo Ships Attacked  
January to December 1995-2010 







1995 188 2 25 1 7 
1996 228 16 25 1 10 
1997 248 6 37 4 7 
1998 202 9 31 3 8 
1999 300 18 52 2 5 
2000 469 22 91 - 12 
2001 335 25 55 - 8 
2002 370 25 44 - 13 
2003 445 49 42 - 14 
2004 329 56 17 - 13 
2005 276 43 22 - 5 
2006 239 35 9 - 4 
2007 263 52 25 1 5 
2008 293 55 30 - 6 
2009 410 69 41 1 5 
2010 445 96 43 1 7 
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There is a dense traffic of hazardous/dangerous cargo ships in the Turkish Straits. 
Some of these cargos have flammable/explosive physical properties. These ships carry 
LPG, crude oil and oil products between the Black Sea littoral countries to Turkey, 
Europe, North Africa and the Americas. They carry LNG from Algeria and Nigeria to 
Turkey. Other flammable/explosive chemical materials like ethylene, propylene, and 
ammonium nitrate are also transported through the straits.    
There are two LNG terminals in Turkey. One of them is in the coast of Sea of 
Marmara (BOTAS-Marmara Ereglisi LNG Terminal), and the other one in Aegean Sea 
coast (EGEGAZ-Aliaga LNG Terminal) [49].  
 
Figure 22.   LNG Terminals of Europe (From [49]) 
The LNG imported from Algeria and Nigeria passes through the Canakkale Strait 
and goes to the Marmara Ereglisi LNG Terminal. There is no LNG terminal in north of 
the Sea of Marmara and in the Black Sea as of 2012 [50]. Therefore, there is no LNG 
traffic in the Istanbul Strait. 
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The Turkish Ministry of Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications has 
statistics on the shipping traffic of the Turkish Straits. The tanker traffic is busy. Tankers 
are divided into 4 groups in the statistics: Crude oil tankers (TTA), Chemical tankers 
(TCH), LNG carriers (LNG), and LPG carriers (LPG) [19]. 
Istanbul  Strait  
Years Total Tankers TTA LPG TCH
2000 48,079 4,937 474 682
2001 42,637 5,188 546 782
2002 47,283 6,022 545 860
2003 46,939 6,571 598 928
2004 54,564 7,470 634 1,295
2005 54,794 7,577 681 1,769
2006 54,880 7,659 814 1,680
2007 56,606 7,204 800 2,050
2008 54,396 6,564 764 1,975
2009 51,422 6,557 866 1,876
2010 50,871 6,463 1,100 1,711
2011 49,798 6,229 1,227 1,647
Table 8.   Tanker Statistics of Istanbul Strait (After [19]) 
Canakkale  Strait 
Years Total Tankers TTA LPG LNG TCH 
2000 41,561 5,543 607 65 1,184 
2001 39,249 5,168 605 68 1,087 
2002 42,669 5,650 589 66 1,190 
2003 42,648 6,075 651 66 1,192 
2004 48,421 7,061 764 58 1,133 
2005 49,077 6,564 691 61 1,497 
2006 48,915 7,204 733 65 1,447 
2007 49,913 6,527 696 58 1,990 
2008 48,978 5,990 721 56 1,991 
2009 49,453 6,293 786 56 2,432 
2010 46,686 6,017 844 58 2,333 
2011 45,379 5,661 907 67 2,183 
Table 9.   Tanker Statistics of Canakkale Strait (After [19, 50]) 
 36
B. LNG 
Natural gas is a fossil fuel like coal and crude oil. It is cooled to a temperature of 
approximately -256oF (-160oC) to turn it into liquid form. In this liquefaction process, the 
volume of the natural gas is reduced approximately 600 times. This liquid form is called 
LNG, which is more proper to store and transport. LNG is mostly (95%) methane (CH4), 
and odorless, colorless, flammable, non-toxic and non-corrosive [51].   
LNG has been transported by ship for more than 50 years. “In January 1959, the 
world’s first LNG tanker, The Methane Pioneer, a converted World War II liberty 
freighter containing five, 7000 barrel equivalent aluminum prismatic tanks with balsa 
wood supports and insulation of plywood and urethane, carried an LNG cargo from Lake 
Charles, Louisiana to Canvey Island, United Kingdom. This event demonstrated that 
large quantities of liquefied natural gas could be transported safely across the ocean” 
[51]. Today, there are nearly 400 carriers in the world LNG fleet [52].  
   
Figure 23.   A Typical Moss-sphere-designed LNG ship (From [53]) 
LNG carrier ships have a double-hulled design to increase safety. A typical 
modern LNG carrier is about 300 m. long, 43 m. wide and 12 m. deep. LNG carriers have 
a cruising speed of 21 knots, and their cargo capacities vary from 1,000 to 267,000 cubic 
meters [54]. 
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1. Hazards and Risks 
LNG is not stored under pressure; therefore there is no risk of explosion caused 
by pressure. On the other hand, released LNG vapors are flammable and can become 
explosive under certain conditions. The flammability range depends on the mixture of air 
and LNG vapors. Vapors can be ignited if diluted 5 to 15% by volume in air. Visible 
vapor clouds are formed after the release of LNG. This flammable mixture can be ignited 
from sparks, flames or can spontaneously ignite if the conditions are right.  This is called 
auto-ignition. Because the auto-ignition temperature is above 1000oF (540oC) for LNG, 
the risk of auto-ignition is very low, but is still a concern [55].    
LNG explosions can be separated into two types with respect to the method and 
time of ignition. 
a. Immediate Ignition 
A terrorist attack on an LNG carrier ship with explosives, missiles or 
vehicles (aircraft and ship) will cause an immediate ignition and then a flash fire. This 
will produce a pool of fire, which has an effect on a limited area near the ship [56].     
b. Ignition after Release 
LNG can be released by the terrorists without use of weapons. This may 
cause LNG vapor clouds to move to public areas before exploding. After vaporization 
and being mixed in the right proportions with the air, LNG can be easily ignited. 
The measured minimum ignition energy of LNG vapors is 0.29 mJ (milli-
Joules). Flammable LNG vapors are easily ignited by machinery, 
cigarettes, and static electricity. Static electricity discharged when one 
walks on a carpet or brushes his/her hair is 10 mJ, or 35 times the amount 
required to ignite LNG vapors. A large LNG vapor cloud cannot travel far 
into developed areas without igniting and burning back to the source. [56] 
This is not the case for undeveloped areas. There are three well known 
accidents in which there were no ignitions after the release. Approximately 1,500 to 
2,000 cubic meters of LNG were released from the Camel plant, Algeria, in 1977.  
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However, the resulting vapor cloud did not ignite. Released LNG vapors also did not 
ignite in accidents at Das Island, United Arab Emirates, in 1978 and Bontang, Indonesia, 
in 1993 [57].  
Based on the above explanations, a terrorist organization most probably 
would choose the ignition after release option because of its catastrophic explosion.  
Melhem et al. [56] report that the major injuries and significant damage to 
property resulting from an intentional LNG breach extends no more than one half mile 
from the spill origin.  
2. Safety Requirements for LNG 
a. Primary Containment 
The most important safety requirement is adequate primary containment. 
Using proper materials and engineering designs for primary storage tanks is the only way 
to provide this safety. 
b. Secondary Containment 
If LNG should leak or spill from the primary storage tank, a secondary 
containment layer will keep the LNG safely isolated from the environment.  
c. Safeguard Systems 
As in other dangerous material industries, safeguards can detect leaks or 
fire and shut off systems when there is a breach in the containment system. These have a 
great role in LNG safety.  
d. Separation Distance 
LNG facilities must be sited away from other facilities or public areas. 
There must also be safety zones around LNG carrier ships. These safe distances and 
safety zones are stipulated by government regulations based on LNG vapor dispersion 
data, thermal radiation contours and other considerations [55]. 
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In case of a terrorist attack on an LNG carrier ship, separation distance is 
the most important safety requirement to protect the public from the effects of explosion. 
If LNG is released, the vapor clouds may move to populated areas before exploding. This 
may cause a catastrophic loss of life in the Turkish Straits. 
The narrow geographical conditions and the dense marine traffic of the 
straits do not allow the necessary safe distances or zones around LNG carrier ships. 
3. LNG Accident History 
There have been fewer than a hundred reported incidents (19 land-based LNG 
facilities, 31 LNG ships, and 22 LNG tanker truck) in the 70-year-old history of the LNG 
industry [57]. The three significant accidents are: 
a. Cleveland, Ohio: 1944 
During World War II, there was a shortage of stainless steel. In that period 
the East Ohio Gas Company expanded its facility by adding a larger tank. The stainless 
steel shortage caused compromises in the design of the new tank which failed after a 
short service. The released LNG formed vapor clouds in the neighborhood area and the 
storm-sewer system, and the vaporized gas in the storm-sewer system ignited. The 
explosion killed 128 people [55], [57]. 
b. Staten Island, New York: 1973 
Operators in the Texas Eastern Transmission Company peakshaving 
facility detected tears causing leaks in an LNG tank. The tank was emptied; 
unfortunately, an ignition and a fire occurred during the repairs. This fire increased the 
tank pressure, causing an explosion that dislodged a 6-inch-thick concrete roof. This 
accident killed 40 people [55], [57]. 
c. Skikda, Algeria: 2004 
A leak in a hydrocarbon refrigerant system formed a vapor cloud, an 
ignition occurred, followed by an explosion. The fire and more explosions destroyed part 
of the facility and killed 27 people and injured 72 more [57]. 
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4. Maximum Impact Scenario for Immediate Ignition  
Melhem et al. [58] assume a scenario in which a terrorist successfully creates a 1-
meter-diameter hole in the center tank of an LNG carrier ship at the waterline. The carrier 
is berthed and fully loaded (200,000 cubic meters). They assume that the hole is created 
using an explosive charge delivered from a vehicle like a small aircraft, and then an 
immediate ignition occurs. The immediate ignition causes an unconfined pool fire.  
According to this scenario, if simultaneous failure of three or four tanks occurs, 
approximately 150,000 cubic meters of LNG would be released in 5 minutes. A flame 
emissive power of 220 kW/m2 extends to a distance of 3.7 km (the 50% fatality limit), 
excluding the contribution of solar flux. This fatality range shows that a terrorist attack 
on LNG carrier ships could cause catastrophic results in the Turkish Straits. 
 
Figure 24.   Thermal Radiation Hazard Zones in Percentage of Fatalities (After [58]) 
C. LPG 
LPG is mainly propane (C3H8), butane (C4H10) or a mixture of propane and 
butane. “LPG is usually derived from fossil fuel sources, being manufactured during 
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refining of crude oil, or extracted from oil or gas streams as they emerge from the 
ground” [59]. LPG is colorless, flammable, and it forms an explosive mixture with air. 
There are three types of LPG carrier ships: fully refrigerated ships, semi-
pressurized (semi-refrigerated) ships, and fully pressurized ships. The world’s existing 
LPG fleet numbers 1,092 ships with 166 vessels on order as of May 1, 2010. Semi-
pressurized gas carriers constitute the largest group with 532 vessels. This type of carrier 
has a capacity ranging from a few hundred to 10,000 cubic meters of LPG [60].  
   
Figure 25.   A Typical LPG Carrier Ship (From [61]) 
The Turkish Straits have a busy traffic of LPG carrier ships. Turkey has lots of 
LPG terminals around the Sea of Marmara due to the high need for energy of the 
country’s most industrialized and populated region. There are also many LPG terminals 
in the Black Sea: Russia (Temryuk, Taman), Ukraine (Odessa, Illichivsk, Kerch), 
Georgia (Batumi), and Abkhazia (Sukhumi).  
1. Types of LPG Explosions 
Basically, there are two types of LPG explosion: a vapor cloud explosion (VCE) 
and a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE).    
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a. VCE 
A VCE is the most destructive type of explosion for chemical industries. 
The sequence of steps is the same as for the LNG vapor explosion analyzed in the 
previous section. First, a large quantity of flammable vapor suddenly releases, the vapor 
throughout the plant site disperses while mixing with air, and finally 
the vapor cloud ignites. The vapor cloud can be ignited if diluted between 2.1 to 9.5% by 
volume in air [55]. 
b. BLEVE 
If a vessel partly filled with liquid [but] with vapor above filling the 
remainder of the container, is ruptured -for example, due to corrosion, or 
failure under pressure- the vapor portion may rapidly leak, lowering the 
pressure inside the container. This sudden drop in pressure inside the 
container causes violent boiling of the liquid, which rapidly liberates large 
amounts of vapor. The pressure of this vapor can be extremely high, 
causing a significant wave of overpressure (an explosion) which may 
completely destroy the storage vessel and project fragments over the 
surrounding area. [62]  
2. LPG Accident History 
There have been several LPG accidents. One significant and one recent accident 
are presented in here: 
a. San Juanico, Mexico City, Mexico, 1984 
This is one of the deadliest disasters in industrial world history. A pipe 
rupture during LPG transfer caused a gas leak in the PEMEX LPG terminal in San 
Juanico. 10 minutes after the leakage, the gas vapor cloud ignited. Then a tank underwent 
a BLEVE. This explosion caused a chain of accidents or domino effect. Twelve separate 
BLEVEs occurred within an hour. Explosions propelled metal fragments up to 




b. Viareggio, Italy, 2009 
As Brambilla et al. summarize: 
A freight train carrying LPG went off the rails and five out of fourteen 
wagons derailed and overturned. A hole formed in the first tank car due to 
the impact with a signaling stake. The pressurized LPG was released as a 
two-phase jet: the liquid phase formed a boiling pool on the ballast while 
the dense gas dispersed in the atmosphere. The dense cloud spread and 
moved towards the neighboring houses. Afterwards, the cloud was ignited 
and exploded. The overpressure destroyed some residential buildings in 
the area closest to the explosion epicenter, while glasses were shattered in 
a larger area. Thirty-one people died and a number of residents were 
injured due to the fires that engulfed the surrounding houses.” [64] 
Each tank was loaded with 45 tons of LPG. After the first release of LPG from the tank, 
the vapor cloud moved for 2 to 5 minutes before the explosion. [64] 
3. Conclusion 
In the Viareggio accident, a tank with the capacity of 45 tons of LPG killed 
31 people in the neighboring area. An average LPG carrier ship has a cargo of thousands 
of tons of LPG. An explosion in such a carrier passing through the Turkish Straits may 
cause the death of thousands of people. Therefore, LPG carriers are high value targets for 
maritime terrorism.  
D. OTHER DANGEROUS CHEMICAL CARGO 
Other than LNG and LPG there are different types of dangerous chemical cargo 
transported through the Turkish Straits. Some of these chemicals have relatively greater  
shipping statistics, such as ethylene (C2H4), ammonia (NH3), ammonium nitrate 
(NH4NO3), and propylene (C3H6). The most dangerous of these chemicals are ammonium 
nitrate and ethylene [65]. 
1. Ammonium Nitrate 
Ammonium nitrate is a highly explosive chemical [65]. There have been 
3 significant ship accidents involving NH4NO3 and in all the accidents the ships exploded 
and sank. The first one was the cargo ship Grandcamp accident in Texas City, US, in 
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1947. The ship was loaded with 2,600 tons of ammonium nitrate. A fire was detected, 
and an hour later the ship exploded, killing several hundred people. The explosion caused 
fire to another vessel, the High Flyer, moored 250 meters away. This ship also had 960 
tons of ammonium nitrate, and subsequently exploded [66]. 
In 1947, the cargo ship Ocean Liberty exploded because of a fire. The ship was 
loaded with 3,300 tons of ammonium nitrate. 29 people died and the port of Brest, 
France, was seriously damaged [66]. 
In 1954 the cargo ship Tirrenia exploded in the Red Sea, the explosion caused by 
fire like the previous accidents. The ship was abandoned before the explosion; therefore, 
nobody died [66]. 
Other than the ships, there have been more than 20 land-based accidents. One of 
them is presented here as an example. A fire caused the explosion of 23 tons of 
ammonium nitrate in Kansas City, Missouri in November 1988. There were 2 blasts, 
creating two craters 30 meters (100 feet) wide and 2.4 meters (8 feet) deep. Residential 
windows in a 16 km (10 miles) range were shattered, and the explosions could be heard 
64 km (40 miles) away [66]. 
In all these accidents, there was no immediate explosion after the fire. Therefore, 
in case of a fire, there is a chance to prevent the explosion. However, if the fire is not 
extinguished, the results can be catastrophic.     
2. Ethylene 
Ethylene is extremely flammable. LPG ships may also carry ethylene. Therefore 
ethylene carriers are considered as a part of the LPG fleet. Figure 26 illustrates the 
number of fully refrigerated, ethylene, semi-refrigerated, and fully pressurized ships of 
the world [60]. Ethylene carriers are fully refrigerated ships which have a double-
bottomed design.  
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Figure 26.   World’s LPG and Ethylene Fleet (From [60]) 
3. Conclusion 
Based on the above information, like LNG and LPG cargo, dangerous chemicals 
transported through the Turkish Straits are also high-value targets for maritime terrorism.  
An explosion in such a carrier passing through the Turkish Straits may cause the death of 
thousands of people.  
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V. DETERMINING THE MOST PROBABLE SCENARIO  
This chapter seeks to answer three questions about maritime terrorism in the 
Turkish Straits: 
 Which strait is the most probable location of a terrorist attack: Istanbul or 
Canakkale? 
 Which type of ship has the highest value for a terrorist attack:  LNG, LPG 
or other flammable/explosive cargo carriers?  
 Which method will probably be used by terrorists:  hijacking, shoulder-
fired missiles, small aircraft, or other methods?  
A. SELECTION OF STRAIT  
Executing a successful maritime terrorism attack in the straits may create 
catastrophic results, including: 
 Loss of thousands of lives,  
 An economic crisis, 
 Closure of the straits to navigation, 
 An environmental catastrophe. 
The Istanbul Strait divides the city of Istanbul, the most crowded city of Turkey, 
in half. There were 13,624,240 people living in Istanbul at the end of 2011 (18.2% of 
Turkey’s population) [2]. The population is very dense around the strait. Istanbul is the 
economic center of Turkey. The city produces 27% of the gross national domestic 
product (GDP) and 38% of total industrial output [12]. 
Similar to Istanbul, the city of Canakkale is located beside a strait, the Canakkale 
Strait. The total population of the city was 486,445 people at the end of 2011, and the 
population around the strait was just under 200,000 people [17]. The economy depends 
on the agriculture and fishing industries. 
Based on the above information, the Istanbul Strait would probably be the first 
choice of a terrorist organization executing a maritime terrorism attack. Istanbul is the 
heart of Turkey. 
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B. SELECTION OF SHIP TYPE  
There is a dense traffic of hazardous/dangerous cargo ships in the Turkish Straits. 
Some of these cargos have flammable/explosive physical properties. An explosion of one 
of these ships would obviously increase the damaging effects of the terrorist attack 
because of its cargo. These ships are high-value targets. As mentioned before, these ships 
carry LPG, crude oil and oil products between the Black Sea littoral countries and 
Turkey, Europe, North Africa and the Americas; they carry LNG from Algeria and 
Nigeria to Turkey. Other flammable/explosive chemical materials like ethylene, 
propylene, and ammonium nitrate are also transported through the straits.    
LNG is flammable, and it forms an explosive mixture with air. According to the 
worst case scenario of Melhem et al. [58], in case of simultaneous failure of three or four 
tanks of an LNG carrier ship after a terrorist attack, approximately 150,000 cubic meters 
of LNG would be released within 5 minutes. A flame emissive power of 220 kW/m2 
extends to a distance of 3.7 km (the 50% fatality limit), excluding the contribution of 
solar flux. This fatality range shows that a terrorist attack on LNG carrier ships could 
cause catastrophic results in the Turkish Straits, especially in crowded Istanbul.  
There are two LNG terminals in Turkey. One of them is on the coast of the Sea of 
Marmara (BOTAS-Marmara Ereglisi LNG Terminal), and the other is on the Aegean Sea 
coast (EGEGAZ-Aliaga LNG Terminal) [49]. No LNG terminal is in the north of the Sea 
of Marmara, nor in the Black Sea as of the year 2012. Therefore, there is no LNG traffic 
in the Istanbul Strait currently. In future, Ukraine and other Black Sea countries may 
build LNG terminals in the Black Sea to import cheaper LNG from Algeria, Nigeria or 
other countries [67].    
A typical LNG ship’s cargo is 10 to 15 times greater than a typical LPG ship’s 
cargo, so the damaging effect of an LNG carrier ship explosion is much greater than that  
of a LPG carrier. On the other hand, an attack on an LNG carrier ship can only be 
executed in the Canakkale Strait as of today. Therefore, LNG carrier ships are not 
assumed targets of first choice by a terrorist organization.  
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The most dangerous chemicals transported through the straits are ammonium 
nitrate and ethylene. Ammonium nitrate is a highly explosive chemical, and ethylene is 
extremely flammable [65]. There are few scientific reports about the dangers of 
ammonium nitrate and ethylene (fatality range, etc.) as opposed to LNG and LPG, and 
there are no accessible shipping statistical reports about these materials. Based on reports 
about the previous accidents, no immediate explosion follows the fire [66]. Therefore, in 
case of a fire, there is a chance to prevent the explosion. Because of the limited public 
information about these chemicals and a comparatively high possibility of extinguishing 
the fire, a terrorist organization may not choose to attack these ships.    
LPG is flammable, and it forms an explosive mixture with air. The Turkish Straits 
host a large traffic of LPG carrier ships. We know that in the Viareggio accident, an LPG 
tank with capacity of 45 tons caused the deaths of 31 people in a neighborhood area [64]. 
An average LPG carrier ship has a cargo of thousands of tons of LPG. An explosion in 
such a carrier passing through the Turkish Straits may cause the death of thousands of 
people. As mentioned before, there are 2 types of LPG explosion: a vapor cloud 
explosion (VCE) and a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE). If a terrorist 
organization prefers the VCE, the ship can explode before passing the busiest part of the 
strait because of the unpredictable explosion time of the VCE. Therefore, terrorists 
probably would choose the BLEVE. 
Many works about LPG accidents in history exist, and it is easy to access LPG 
shipping statistics. There are many LPG terminals in Turkey and the Black Sea littoral 
countries. Terrorist organizations can access the fatality range, shipping traffic statistics, 
and export/import terminal information about LPG.  
Based on the above information LPG carrier ships will probably be the first 
choice of a terrorist organization executing a maritime terrorism attack.  
C. SELECTION OF METHOD OF ATTACK  
As decided, the most dangerous scenario for the Turkish Straits is explosion of an 
LPG carrier ship during its passage of the Istanbul Strait. There are several applicable 
methods to realize this maritime terrorism. Before analyzing these methods separately, 
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two of the factors that affect the decision process of terrorist organizations about methods 
of attack are explained. These factors are the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group 
(BLACKSEAFOR) and the Automatic Identification System (AIS).  
1. Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group 
The BLACKSEAFOR is a multinational (the Black Sea littoral states of Turkey, 
Russia, Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Georgia) on-call naval peace task force. The 
task force is composed of a minimum of 4 to 6 ships from the member countries. The 
main ship types are frigate/destroyer, corvette/patrol boat, mine counter-measures ship, 
amphibious ship and auxiliary ship. [68] 
The BLACKSEAFOR was established at the initiation of Turkey for the purpose 
of enhancing peace and stability in the Black Sea area. After the 11th of September 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center Towers in New York, the BLACKSEAFOR 
transformed its purposes. “The main purposes of transformation of BLACKSEAFOR are; 
 To activate BLACKSEAFOR two times in a year to conduct unscheduled 
activations and to conduct training programs in areas including preventing 
the threat of terrorism and eliminating illicit trafficking in weapons of 
mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials, 
 To change BLACKSEAFOR with the constabulary mission including 
struggling with global terror, 
 To have a permanent command center on a rotational basis, 
 To have an information exchange system amongst Black Sea littorals.” 
[68] 
2. Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
AIS transponders automatically provide a ship’s information (identity, type, 
position, course, speed, navigational status and other safety-related information) to other 
ships and to coastal stations [69]. In 2000, the International Maritime Organization (IMO)  
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created a new requirement. According to this requirement, International Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Regulation 19, Chapter V, most ships must carry AIS 
transponders on board.  
The regulation requires AIS to be fitted aboard all ships of 300 gross 
tonnages and upwards engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 
500 gross tonnages and upwards not engaged on international voyages and 
all passenger ships irrespective of size. The requirement became effective 
for all ships by 31 December 2004. [70]  
AIS information is easily accessible on the internet. Figure 27 shows an example 
of the maritime traffic of the Istanbul Strait at 14.22 pm on 18 January 2012. Detailed 
information about selected ships (by user) is also available [71]. 
 
Figure 27.   Accessible AIS Information on Internet (From [71]) 
3. Analysis of the Methods 
These are the possible ways to execute a terrorist attack on an LPG carrier ship in 
the Istanbul Strait: 
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a. Small Boat Attack (Unmanned or Suicide Attack) 
There is both international (about 50,000 ships pass yearly [18], [19]) and 
local (up to 2,500 vessels daily [72]) ship traffic in the Istanbul Strait. This traffic density 
increases the risk of a small boat attack. Terrorists could conduct this type of attack with 
explosive-loaded small boats, both remotely operated (unmanned) and crewed (suicide 
attack) small boats. Currently there are some measures to prevent a small boat attack in 
the straits.   
Turkey announced Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Turkish Straits in 
1998. Article 26 of this regulation requires that “Vessels carrying dangerous and/or 
hazardous cargo or wastes, at least 72 hours before fixing a voyage through the straits, 
must contact with the administration and inform the type of cargo planned to carry with 
all necessary certificates” [73]. In this way, Turkey is able to take safety and security 
measures. These ships are observed before entering the strait and during their passages by 
land stations.  
There are two methods of observation. AIS provides information about the 
current positions, courses and maritime traffic around these ships. The BLACKSEAFOR 
task group and the land-based radars of the member countries also   may provide 
information about dangerous cargo carrier ships.  
During the passages of these type ships, Turkey has a right to stop other 
marine traffic of the strait. For example, Canakkale Strait was closed to maritime traffic 
during the passage of the 289-meter-long LNG ship Adamawa in November 2011 [74]. In 
general, this limitation is not applied to local traffic.  
Based on the above information, a small boat can be detected before 
hitting an LPG carrier. However, these boats are generally fast, and there might not be 
enough time to prevent the attack. The only foolproof way to prevent this type of attack is 
to escort all dangerous cargo carriers during their passage. The Turkish Coast Guard 
escorts all LNG, LPG, and other dangerous cargo carriers during their passage in the 
straits. Because of this measure, a small boat attack probably will not be the first choice 
for a method of attack by a terrorist organization.  
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b. Small Aircraft Attack (Unmanned or Suicide Attack)  
Terrorists can use explosive-loaded small aircraft in the same manner as 
small boats. Both remotely operated (unmanned) and crewed (suicide attack) small 
aircraft can be used. Controlling the air traffic above the city of Istanbul is the only way 
to prevent this type of attack.  
The purpose of this research is to improve the capabilities of the Turkish 
Navy and Coast Guard Commands against the maritime terrorism. As preventing aircraft 
attacks is not among the main missions of these commands, this method is not analyzed.     
c. Small Underwater Vehicle Attack (Unmanned or Suicide Attack)  
Terrorists can also use explosive-loaded underwater vehicles both 
remotely operated (unmanned) and crewed (suicide attack). Acoustic sensors (like 
hydrophones and sonar devices) are a useful way to detect underwater vehicles and 
prevent such an attack. For the terrorist to execute such an attack requires a high level of 
secrecy, technical knowledge, and craft experience. Because of its difficulty level, this 
method probably would not be the first choice of a terrorist organization. 
d. Mines and Controlled Bombs  
 Terrorists can place mines and controlled bombs that can be activated 
during the cruise of the ship. Because of the difficulty level, this method probably would 
not be the first choice of a terrorist organization. 
e. Shoulder-Fired Missile Attack  
The Istanbul Strait has an average width of 0.81 NM, and a minimum 
width of 0.38 NM [7], [8]. Therefore, a standoff missile attack is a serious security 
problem for the strait. There are regulations governing the hull types of 
hazardous/dangerous cargo tankers. As an example, all tankers built after 1994 must have 
double hulls to enter U.S. ports [31]. The double hull type of construction of the ships 
may prevent explosion of the cargo and sinking of the tanker. Therefore, the results of a 
standoff missile attack may be limited, so this may force the terrorists to change the 
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method of attack. Because the possibility of the ship exploding after a shoulder-fired 
missile attack is low, this method would not be the first choice of a terrorist organization.  
f. Hijacking  
The shipping route of oil and gas products is from the Black Sea to the 
Mediterranean Sea. Terrorists could use small boats to board and guns to take control of 
the tanker in the Black Sea. After the hijacked tanker entered the strait, terrorists would 
have two options: collision or explosion. The crew of the hijacked ship may inform 
authorities, and AIS and/or BLACKSEAFOR may detect hijacking. If the hijacked ship is 
away from the straits, the BLACKSEAFOR task group, Turkish Navy or Turkish Coast 
Guard Command could execute an operation to take control of the ship from the 
terrorists. In the worst case scenario, these forces could sink the hijacked ship before it 
entered the Istanbul Strait. In conclusion, the method of hijacking probably would not be 
the first choice of a terrorist organization.  
g. Crew Conspiracy  
Some of the crew could be members of a terrorist organization. In this 
way, terrorists do not have to execute a boarding operation, and the probability of being 
detected is minimized. These terrorist crew members may take control of the ship just 
before entering the Istanbul Strait. Similar to the hijacking scenario, after the tanker 
entered the strait, terrorists would have two options: collision or explosion. This method 
limits the actions of the Navy and Coast Guard in preventing the destruction of the 
hijacked LPG carrier ship. Based on the above information, crew conspiracy would 
probably be the first choice of a terrorist organization in executing a maritime terrorism 
attack.  
D. THE FINAL SCENARIO 
According to the results of this analysis, the easiest and the most effective 
demonstration of maritime terrorism is exploding an LPG carrier ship during its voyage 
through the Istanbul Strait by the method of crew conspiracy. The summary of the 
results: 
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 Selected strait: Istanbul Strait 
 Selected ship type: LPG carrier  
 Selected method of attack: Crew conspiracy 
A sample ship for this scenario is to be selected before analyzing the protection 
methods in the next chapter.     
1. Selection of the Sample Ship 
The main purpose of this research is to design an applicable underwater system to 
improve the capabilities of protection against maritime terrorism. Therefore, the selection 
process of the sample ship must be realistic. There are three factors which must be 
considered.  
First, a currently existing ship must be selected. The ship must actually voyage 
through the Istanbul Strait in real life. AIS has real-time marine traffic information, and 
there are lots of online web sites which have marine traffic information based on the AIS. 
An LPG carrier can be selected randomly by using these web sites after checking the 
cargo, departure and arrival-port history, and current position information. However, the 
randomly selected ship must meet some other requirements to be selected by a terrorist 
organization. 
The second factor is the size of the ship. Turkey has a right to stop other marine 
traffic in the strait during the passage of hazardous cargo ships. Currently, this right is 
applied only to large vessels. Accordingly, these ships can be easily observed and 
escorted by the authorities during their passages. Therefore, from the point of view of a 
terrorist organization, it is better to select a relatively small LPG carrier.  
The world’s LPG fleet has more than 1,000 ships which have a capacity ranging 
from a few hundred to 85,000 cubic-meters of LPG [60], [75]. The average capacity of 
LPG carriers that voyage between Mediterranean ports is 11,291 deadweight tons 
(DWT), and the average capacity of the Mediterranean transits is 30,037 DWT [76]. The 
selected ship must be smaller than these ships. 
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The type of the LPG carrier ship has an effect on its size. Semi-pressurized/semi-
refrigerated LPG carriers are the largest group, numbering 532 vessels of the more than 
1000 ships of the world’s LPG fleet. This type of ship has a capacity ranging from a few 
hundred to 10,000 cubic-meters of LPG [60], [75]. This is a relatively low capacity when 
compared with the 85,000 cubic-meters of the largest ships. Therefore, the sample ship 
might well be selected from this most-crowded type of LPG carriers, based on their 
smaller sizes and high numbers. 
The third factor is a combination of ownership, crew, and route of the ships. Some 
LPG carrier ships only cruise on constant routes. If an LPG company with storage and 
processing facilities has its own fleet and long-term contracts, most probably they will 
use their own ships on constant routes. Therefore, a crew member will have better 
knowledge of the ship, the cargo, the other crew members, and the LPG cargo terminals. 
In this case, a crew conspiracy is less likely.  
On the other hand, if the ship is owned by an LPG shipping company, then it can 
be rented by different LPG storage and processing companies and it may cruise between 
different ports based on the trade routes of the companies. From the point of view of a 
terrorist organization, it is better to select an LPG carrier that is owned by an LPG 
shipping company and that cruises between different ports.  
Finally, based on these factors a group of LPG carriers were analyzed using the 
information provided by online web sites [71], [77], [78]. The LPG carrier ship Syn Mira 
(IMO 8705723) was selected as the sample ship. The Syn Mira (sample ship) is a semi-
pressurized/semi-refrigerated LPG carrier ship owned by an LPG shipping company [79].  
The sample ship does not voyage on constant routes as seen in this (Table 10) list 

















Table 10.   Port History of the Sample Ship (From [77]) 
 
Figure 28.   AIS - Voyage of the Sample Ship through the Istanbul Strait (From [71]) 
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Figure 29.   Sample Ship (From [80]) 
Characteristics of the Sample Ship 
LOA 97.5 m 
LBP 90.0 m 
Breadth 14.8 m 
Draught 6.7 m 
DWT 4,283 MT 
Light displacement 2,784 MT 
Loaded displacement 7,027 MT 
Main engine power 3,088 Kw 
Shaft generator 1,200 Kw 
Maximum speed recorded by AIS 10.5 knots 
Average speed recorded by AIS 9.1 knots 
Table 11.   Characteristics of the Sample Ship (From [79], [81]) 
2. Summary of the Scenario 
Based on analysis and assumptions, the most probable method of maritime 
terrorism is the explosion of the sample ship during its passage through the Istanbul 
Strait. It is assumed that the terrorists will use crew conspiracy to execute this attack and 
they will keep the ship in the traffic lane before and during the passage. In this way, 
protective actions of the Navy and Coast Guard will be minimized. The purpose of this 
research is to design a system for protecting the Istanbul Strait against this scenario. 
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Methods of protection against this scenario will be analyzed in the next chapter. 
Before the analysis, the route of the sample ship must be determined. The sample ship 
has an average speed of 9.1 knots [81]. There is a north-to-south surface current in the 
strait with a speed of up to 4 knots, and peak current speed may reach 7–8 knots in 
narrow sections [7], [9]. Therefore, it is easy to navigate from north-to-south. The 
average current at the northern entrance of the Istanbul Strait is 1 knot [15]. Also, it is 
easier to stop a ship which cruises from south-to-north. Because, in this research, the 
most probable worst-case scenario is considered, it is assumed that the ship is cruising 
from north-to-south, the same direction as the surface current. 
The southern part of the strait has a higher population density, so the damaging 
effects of an explosion in the southern part will be greater. Therefore, the terrorists will 
wait until the ship arrives in that portion of the strait. Finally, it is assumed that the 
sample ship is cruising from north to south and the terrorists plan to create the explosion 
in the southern part of the strait.   
 
Figure 30.   Assumed Direction of Cruise and Area of Attack (After [82]) 
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VI. PROTECTION AGAINST THE MOST PROBABLE 
SCENARIO  
There are many advanced methods for protection against maritime terrorism. 
However, if authorities do not have enough time to apply these methods, there will be no 
protection. The only way to solve this problem is to receive intelligence as early as 
possible. If the terrorists take control of the sample ship and then cruise to the southern 
part of the Istanbul Strait without being detected, there is no possibility of preventing the 
explosion; the terrorists will successfully execute this attack. Even if authorities have 
many different methods of defense, there is no way to apply these methods without 
intelligence. As mentioned before, the purpose of this research is to design a new system 
to improve the capabilities of protection against maritime terrorism once it has been 
recognized. Therefore, it is assumed that the authorities have intelligence about the 
terrorists in the sample ship.  
First, existing protection methods were analyzed based on the most probable 
scenario. This analysis, determined whether the currently available capabilities are 
enough to stop the sample ship. Then, a new system was designed to improve the 
capabilities of protection by analyzing the not yet extant methods. 
A. EXISTING METHODS FOR STOPPING THE SAMPLE SHIP 
The existing methods are divided into two groups: 
 Methods for preventing a terrorist attack on a target ship, 
 Methods for taking control of the ship from the terrorists. 
1. Analysis of the Existing Methods for Preventing a Terrorist Attack on 
a Target Ship 
The terrorists eliminated all existing methods for preventing a terrorist attack on a 
target ship by using the crew-conspiracy method. Other than these, the methods which  
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have size limitations (barriers, stopping the propeller of a small boat) are also 
inapplicable in this scenario because of the length (97.5 meters), and the displacement 
(7,027 MT) of the sample ship. 
Therefore, there is no need to analyze these methods. The summary of the 
inapplicable methods for this scenario: 
Inapplicable - Existing Methods for Preventing a Terrorist Attack on 
a Target Ship for the Most Probable Scenario 
Protection 
Yes No 
Escorting Ships While Cruising In Critical Waters - X 
Patrolling around Important Maritime Platforms and Shore Facilities - X 
Using Non-Lethal Weapons - X 
Stopping the Propeller of a Small Boat - X 
Using Scanning Devices for Finding the Terrorists and Bombs  - X 
Applying Early Detection Systems   - X 
Having Security Teams on Board of Commercial Ships  - X 
Using Barriers - X 
Table 12.    Existing Methods for Preventing a Terrorist Attack on a Target Ship  
2. Analysis of the Applicable - Existing Methods for Taking Control of 
the Ship from the Terrorists for the Most Probable Scenario 
a. Boarding 
The Coast Guard and Navy have special boarding teams that can execute 
an operation to take control of the ship from terrorists. On the other hand, there are two 
other possibilities. First, the boarding operation may be unsuccessful, and the sample ship 
may enter the strait. Second, it may be too late for the teams to board the sample ship 
when intelligence arrives. If the sample ship is very close to the entrance of the strait, 
there may not be enough time for boarding. In conclusion, information must be timely 
acquired, and the boarding must be successfully executed.  
If boarding is unsuccessful, there might not be enough time for a second 
operation, or if information about the plot is late and the sample ship is already close to 
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the entrance of the strait, there is currently no other way to stop the ship. The authorities 
must have alternative methods besides boarding. In the end, boarding may not be a 
guaranteed solution for this scenario. 
b. Gunfire by Warships, Aircraft, or Land-Based Platforms 
Gunfire can be used to shoot the sample ship, but this may cause an 
immediate LPG explosion, sinking of the ship and an environmental catastrophe. These 
results are acceptable compared with the death of thousands of innocent people in 
Istanbul. It is obvious, however, that the sample ship must be stopped or sunk before it 
enters the strait. To apply this method, there must be enough time to dispatch the closest 
or fastest warship, submarine or aircraft. Land-based artillery or missile stations also can 
be used.   
As in the boarding method, this method can be applied if the ship is away 
from the straits. Otherwise, use of gunfire against the sample ship is not possible. 
Therefore, this method is not applicable if the sample ship is in the strait.   
c. Tugboats 
Using high-powered tugboats can be an effective solution to the light 
displacement of terrorist ships and boats. Tugboats may steer the course of the sample 
ship towards land and cause grounding of the ship before it enters the strait. Similar to the 
boarding and gunfire methods, if the ship is away from the straits, this method can be 
applied.  
On the other hand, protective efforts of tugboats can be eliminated if the 
terrorists have skills enough to maneuver the sample ship. In this scenario of a crew 
conspiracy some of the terrorists may have the capability of navigating the ship.    
3. Summary of the Existing Methods 
These methods can be divided into three categories based on their protective 
functions in the scenario: 
 Yes:  Applicable in the scenario. 
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 Depends: Applicable only in specific conditions. 
 No: Inapplicable in the scenario.  
Existing Methods 
Protection  
Yes Depends No 
Escorting the Ships While Cruising In  
Critical Waters - - X 
Patrolling around the Important Maritime  
Platforms and Shore Facilities - - X 
Using Non-Lethal Weapons - - X 
Stopping the Propeller of a Small Boat - - X 
Using Scanning Devices for Finding the  
Terrorists and Bombs  - - X 
Early Detection Systems   - - X 
Having Security Teams on Board of the  
Commercial Ships  - - X 
Barriers  - - X 
Boarding - X - 
Gunfire - X - 
Tugboats - X - 
Table 13.   Summary of Existing Methods  
Table 13 demonstrates that, currently, there is no absolute protection against the 
most probable scenario. The sample ship may cruise to the southern part of the strait to 
execute the terrorism attack. Therefore, a new system must be designed to improve 
protection by analyzing currently non-existent methods.  
B. NON-EXISTENT METHODS FOR STOPPING THE SAMPLE SHIP 
1. Analysis of the Non-Existent Methods  
a. Stopping the Propeller 
As mentioned before, currently there is no system for stopping a ship’s 
propeller. Rope, wire, and/or nets can be wrapped around the ship’s propeller. In this 
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way, the propeller can be stopped or, at least, the thrust and propeller’s efficiency can be 
reduced. Though the U.S. Coast Guard is using a system for stopping a small boat’s 
propeller [41], this system has size limitations and is inapplicable for the sample ship. In 
the future, a method for stopping a ship’s propeller can be a proper solution to the 
scenario. On the other hand, there are some products that can be installed between the 
propeller and the shaft to cut the ropes or lines wrapped around the propeller [83]. While 
these cutters are not commonly in use, their effects must be considered. 
b. Damaging the Propeller 
Currently, there is no system for damaging a ship’s propeller. In the 
future, light-weight underwater weapons may be used to damage the propeller of the ship. 
Also the dangerous cargo of the sample ship makes this method not applicable in the 
strait. It can be applied out of the strait. 
c. Impeding Steering by Damaging the Rudder 
Currently, there is no system for impeding the steering of a terrorist ship. 
As in the case of the propeller, in the future, light-weight underwater weapons may be 
used to damage the rudder of the ship. The dangerous cargo of the sample ship renders 
this method not applicable in the strait. It can be applied out of the strait. 
d. Stopping the Engines by Interrupting the Air Flow  
Currently, there is no system for interrupting air flow to the engines. This 
method is more impractical or unfeasible than the other methods. 
e. Restricting Visibility  
Currently, there is no system to restrict the visibility of a terrorist ship. As 
well, this method is not applicable for the sample ship because terrorists can use the on-
board radar displays to access navigation information. In the future, this method may 
prevent an attack by small boat, which has no navigational devices.  
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f. Damaging all the Electronic Systems of the Ship by Non-Nuclear 
Electromagnetic Pulse (NNEMP) 
Although an NNEMP weapon may damage electronic systems of a ship, 
all ships have alternative systems for use in case of an emergency or malfunction. These 
alternate systems can control the engines and rudders of the ship, especially mechanical 
systems. Therefore, such systems will not be affected by an NNEMP attack. In the case 
of a crew conspiracy, the success of the NNEMP attack also depends on the nautical 
knowledge of the terrorists. Currently, there is no NNEMP weapon to damage the 
electronic systems of a terrorist ship. 
g. Changing the Course of the Ship by Underwater Explosions  
Changing the course of the terrorist ship may prevent a collision. This 
method is useful in protecting critical maritime platforms, harbor entrances, and shore 
facilities. However, it is inapplicable for the sample ship. The terrorists may simply 
correct the course of the ship and cruise toward the strait. Currently, there is no 
underwater explosion system to change the course of the terrorist ship and prevent 
collision. 
h. Clogging the Seawater Inlets of the Engine’s Cooling System   
Clogging the seawater inlets will cause over-heating in the engines, so the 
engine will be stopped, but this may take some time after clogging. Currently, there is no 
system to clog the seawater inlets of the cooling system of a marine engine.   
i. Remotely Controlled Signals to Stop the Ship’s Engines   
Almost all marine engines have electronic command and control systems. 
If a marine engine manufacturer has designed an engine that can be stopped by a 
remotely controlled signal, it will be easy to stop such a ship. These manufacturers sell 
the same engines for warships. No countries will accept having an engine that can be 
stopped by a remote signal. In the future, a remotely controlled system for stopping the 
engines of a merchant fleet for anti-terrorism purposes is possible, but as in the NNEMP 
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case, ships may have spare mechanical systems to fall back on. Currently, there is no 
system for stopping an engine by remotely controlled signals.    
2. Summary of the Non-Existent Methods 
All the non-existent methods for stopping the sample ship were analyzed. The 
new design must be inspired by one of these methods. Two factors affect the selection of 
the new design. First, the method must be applicable and provide protection in the 
scenario. Second, it must be technologically practical and feasible.  
Non-Existent Methods 
Applicability in the 
Scenario Technological Feasibility 
Yes Depends No High Medium Low 
Stopping the Propeller X - - X - - 
Damaging the Propeller - X - X - - 
Damaging the Rudder - X - X - - 
Interrupting Air Flow X - - - - X 
Restricting Visibility - - X - - X 
NNEMP - X - - X - 
Underwater Explosions - - X X - - 
Clogging the Seawater Inlets X - - - - X 
Remotely Controlled Signals - X - - X - 
Table 14.   Summary of the Non-existent Methods  
Based on these results, stopping the propeller is the most applicable and feasible 
method of stopping the ship. Therefore, the purpose of the new design is to stop the 
propeller of the sample ship. 
C. STOPPING THE PROPELLER OF A TERRORIST SHIP 
In real life, there are many examples of free ropes or nets wrapping around ships’ 
propellers. Wrapping may stop the propeller by decreasing its efficiency and thrust.  
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Figure 31.   Examples of Ropes Wrapped around Propellers (From [84], [85]) 
   
Figure 32.   Examples of Nets Wrapped around Propellers (From [40], [86]) 
There are cases in which this undesirable condition has been employed to great 
effect, such as by anti-whaling activists. In recent years, activists from the ships Sea 
Shepherd and Steve Irwin deployed ropes from zodiac boats to entangle the propellers of 
Japanese whaling vessels. This is not easy to execute. The ropes wrapped around the 
zodiac’s own propeller in one of these attempts, in January, 2011 [87]. Figure 33 shows 
the rope entangled on the propeller of the Japanese whaling ship Yushin Maru No.3 [88].  
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Figure 33.   Rope Entangled on the Propeller of Whaling Ship (From [88]) 
As mentioned before, there are two systems designed to stop the propeller of a 
small boat: the boat trap and the pirate trap. The U.S. Coast Guard is using a non-lethal 
system called “boat trap.” Ballistic nets are strategically dropped from a helicopter to 
wrap the propeller of a terrorist boat. The system stopped 100% of small boat targets in 
the tests [40].  
The pirate trap—designed by the Royal Dutch Coast Guard, the Royal Dutch 
Navy, and the Royal Netherlands Sea Rescue Organization—carries thin lines around the 
ship, both sides and stern, suspended from booms. These thin lines float at the waterline. 
Whenever a small boat broaches this protected area, these lines wrap around the propeller 
and prevent the boat’s progress. [43] 
Examples from real life and the applications of the “boat trap” and “pirate trap” 
demonstrate that ropes and nets can be wrapped around ships’ propellers by chance or on 
purpose. In this way, the propeller’s efficiency is decreased, and the ship is stopped. 
Therefore, wrapping the propeller will be the first objective of the design.  
1. Types of Wrapping  
The ropes or nets can be wrapped around two different parts of the ship’s 




stern tube, propeller shaft and propeller’s hub (boss). The second part is the propeller 
blades. Figure 34 shows the typical view of a ship’s parts that are located outside of the 
hull. 
 
Figure 34.   Parts of Propulsion and Rudder (After [89]) 
 
Figure 35.   Sample Ship has 1 Propeller with 4 Blades (From [81]) 
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a. Wrapping Around the Stern Tube/Shaft/Propeller’s Hub 
These parts are located between the propeller and the hull of the ship. 
Their location and dimensions depend on the choice of the designer. For example, a part 
of the propeller shaft may or may not be seen outside of the hull, depending on the 
design. If the whole shaft (outside of the hull) passes through the stern tube, then it is 
unseen.  
  
Figure 36.   Different Types of Propulsion Design (From [90]) 
When wrapping occurs, the ropes or nets will roll up and accumulate 
towards the propeller’s hub, located just behind the propeller blades, thereby increasing 
the diameter of the hub and decreasing the propeller’s efficiency and its thrust. The ship 
will slow down, and stopping will be easier.   
b. Wrapping Around the Propeller Blades 
The ropes or nets can be wrapped around the propeller blades. For the 
calculations, it is assumed that the ropes or nets become part of the blades after wrapping, 
changing the blades’ dimensions. Therefore, the blade areas and the thickness of the 
blades will be increased. Because of the difference in material properties, the roughness 
of the blades will also be increased. As well, the ropes or nets that are wrapped between 
the blades will increase resistance and change the characteristics of the flow around the  
blades. All these results of wrapping will negatively affect propeller efficiency. As with 
increasing the hub diameter, the thrust will be decreased, and finally, the ship will stop or 
slow down, and stopping the ship will be easier.   
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Figure 37.   Wrapped Ropes around Propeller Blades (After [89]) 
2. Terminology and Equations of Ship Resistance and Propulsion 
The ship propellers convert torque generated by the engines to thrust. To 
understand the relationship between a wrapped propeller or hub and the ship’s speed, the 
terminology and equations of resistance/propulsion must be reviewed. Here is a list of the 
basic terms and equations related to ship resistance and propulsion [91], [92].  
RT:  Total resistance (frictional + wave making + eddy/form + appendage + air) 
T: Thrust 
Q: Torque 
n: Revolutions per second of shaft/propeller 
V: Speed 
VA: Speed of advance 
PE: Effective power: power to overcome total resistance (RT) at a ship speed (V) 
EHP: Effective horse power  
PE  = Total resistance x speed = RT x V 
PT: Useful power output of the propeller (thrust power developed by propellers) 
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THP: Thrust horse power  
PT  = Thrust x speed of advance = T x VA 
ηH: Hull efficiency = PE / PT = (RT x V) / (T x VA)   
QD: Torque required by the propeller to deliver T at VA behind the ship 
PD: Power delivered to the propeller by the prime mover = 2 x π	x	n x QD 
ηB: Propeller efficiency behind the ship = PT / PD = (T x VA) / (2 x π	 x	n x 
QD)  
Q0: Torque required by the propeller to deliver T at VA in open water 
η0: Propeller efficiency in open water = (T x VA) / (2 x π	x	n x Q0)  
ηR: Relative rotative efficiency = ηB / η0 
PS: Shaft power (power before the stern tube bearing) 
SHP: Shaft horse power  
PB: Brake power (power of the prime mover --diesel engines, gas turbines etc.--) 
BHP: Brake horse power  
ηS: Shaft transmission efficiency = PD / PS  
ηP: Overall propulsive efficiency (also known as Propulsive Coefficient (PC)) 
ηP = PE / PS = (PE / PT) x (PT / PD) x (PD / PS) = ηH x ηB x ηS =  ηH x η0 x ηR x ηS    
D: Propeller diameter 
d: Propeller hub diameter 
to : Thickness of blade at hub 
to / D: Blade thickness fraction (ratio) 
c: Chord 
J: Advance ratio = VA / (n x D) 
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ρ: Mass density of water 
KT: Thrust coefficient = T / (ρ x n2 x D4) 
KQ: Torque coefficient = Q / (ρ x n2 x D5) 
η0 = (J / 2 π) x (KT / KQ)  
  
Figure 38.   Sketch of Resistance and Propulsion (From [91]) 
 
Figure 39.   Sketch of a Typical Propeller Blade (From [92]) 
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Figure 40.   Typical Propeller Blade Drawings and Definitions (From [92]) 
3. Calculating the Efficiency Loss after Wrapping 
These are the factors that cause the efficiency loss and increase in resistance after 
wrapping: 
 Increasing the hub diameter 
 Increasing the thickness of the blades (blade thickness fraction (ratio) = 
t/D) 
 Increasing the blade area 
 Increasing the roughness (surface friction of the blades) 
 Other effects (increasing the appendage resistance, friction on shaft and 
changing the flow characteristics). 
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a. Increasing the Hub Diameter 
Both experimental and computational methods are considered to 
demonstrate the loss of propeller efficiency caused by increasing the hub diameter. 
Figure 41 shows the experimental results by D.W. Taylor [93]. Simply, increasing the 
hub diameter causes a loss in propeller efficiency, torque and thrust coefficients. 
 
Figure 41.   Experimental Results of Increasing Hub Diameter (From [93]) 
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A MATLAB code named OpenProp v2.4.6 is used to show the 
computational results [94]. OpenProp is an open-source code suite created by a team of 
researchers at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the Maine Maritime 
Academy for designing optimized marine propellers or axial-flow turbines.  
First, the propeller diameter and the propeller speed values are found by 
using the “parametric study” option of the OpenProp v2.4.6. For parametric study, the 
hub diameter is assumed to be 0.4 meters (default value). In general, the hub diameter of 
ships varies from 0.15D to 0.25D [92]. Therefore, the default value of 0.4 meters is 
proper. This is important because the program designs the propeller based on this hub 
diameter, and the same propeller will be used for the analysis.  
For the parametric study, the number of blades, propeller speed (RPM) 
and propeller diameter all has variable values. Other terms like required thrust, ship 
velocity, hub diameter, and water density have constant values. The thickness type 
NACA 65A010 and the mean-line type NACA a=0.8 are used for all calculations. 
 
Figure 42.   Input Values for the Parametric Study  
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Figure 43.   Results of the Parametric Study 
Based on the results (4-blade propeller - sample ship), three different cases 
of propeller diameter and speed values were selected (for the highest efficiency). 
 Case 1: Propeller diameter = 2.3 m. Propeller speed = 200 RPM 
 Case 2: Propeller diameter = 2.5 m. Propeller speed = 150 RPM 
 Case 3: Propeller diameter = 3 m. Propeller speed = 100 RPM 
In all cases, the ship’s speed is assumed to be 5 m/s (9.71 knots). There are 
two reasons for this decision. First, the sample ship has an average speed of 9.1 knots and 
a maximum speed of 10.5 knots, based on the information by AIS [81]. Second, there is a 
speed limit in the Turkish Straits. Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Turkish Straits 
(Article 13) restrict vessels within the straits to cruising at a speed not more than 10 knots 
over the ground [73].   
Then the “single design” option of the OpenProp v2.4.6 is used to 
calculate the change in propeller efficiency with respect to the increasing hub diameter. 
In all cases, I used the initial value of 0.4 m. for the hub diameter for the first calculation. 
Then I increased the hub diameter and recalculated the efficiency. The increase in the hub 
diameter is assumed to be the wrapped thickness of the ropes or nets around the propeller. 
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Based on the results of OpenProp v2.4.6 the propeller efficiency vs. 
wrapped diameter values are plotted for each case.  
 
Figure 44.   Case 1: Loss of Efficiency by Wrapping 
 
Figure 45.   Case 2: Loss of Efficiency by Wrapping 
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Figure 46.   Case 3: Loss of Efficiency by Wrapping 
Based on these graphs, it is obvious that decreasing propeller efficiency by 
wrapping ropes or nets around the propeller hub is possible. In all cases, there is a sudden 
decrease in efficiency after a specific increase in wrapped hub diameter.  












for ~ 65% 





1 2.3 m. 0.4 m. 1.8 m. 78.26% 1.825 m. 79.35% 
2 2.5 m. 0.4 m. 1.88 m. 75.20% 1.9 m. 76.00% 
3 3 m. 0.4 m. 2.22 m. 74.00% 2.235 m. 74.50% 
Table 15.   Summary of the Results for Case 1,2 and 3 
Based on the results of OpenProp v2.4.6, when the wrapped diameter of 
the hub reaches three-fourths of the propeller diameter, there is an approximately 50% 
decrease in efficiency. After this critical diameter, an additional roughly 1% increase in 
wrapped diameter will cause an approximate 15% loss in efficiency. Therefore, the ropes 
or nets must be wrapped around the hub to more than three-fourths of the propeller 
diameter.  
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0.4 0.73905 5.00 9.71 
0.5 0.73577 4.98 9.67 
0.6 0.73170 4.95 9.62 
0.7 0.72685 4.92 9.55 
0.8 0.72113 4.88 9.48 
0.9 0.71438 4.83 9.39 
1.0 0.70637 4.78 9.28 
1.1 0.69674 4.71 9.16 
1.2 0.68498 4.63 9.00 
1.3 0.67034 4.54 8.81 
1.4 0.65172 4.41 8.57 
1.5 0.62735 4.24 8.25 
1.6 0.59429 4.02 7.81 
1.7 0.54707 3.70 7.19 
1.8 0.47311 3.20 6.22 
1.85 0.41425 2.80 5.44 
1.86 0.39867 2.70 5.24 
1.87 0.38074 2.58 5.00 
1.88 0.35912 2.43 4.72 
1.89 0.32914 2.23 4.33 
1.9 0.24961 1.69 3.28 
Table 16.   Results for the Case 2 
Then the “3-D Geometry Results” of the OpenProp v2.4.6 is used to 
visualize the wrapping of Case 2. The dark gray parts of the drawings represent the ropes 
or nets wrapped around the light gray-colored propeller’s hub. 
 82
 
Figure 47.   Case 2: Wrapped Diameter from 0.4 to 1.1 m.  
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Figure 48.   Case 2: Wrapped Diameter from 1.1 to 1.9 m.  
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b. Increasing the Thickness of the Blades 
Experimental results are considered to demonstrate the loss of propeller 
efficiency caused by increasing the thickness of the blades after wrapping. In one of his 
experiments, D.W. Taylor used 12 blades to analyze efficiency due to blade thickness. 
Six of the blades had a pitch ratio of 0.6, and the other 6 blades had a pitch ratio of 1.2. 
For each different pitch ratio, two different blade widths were chosen, and for each of 
these different widths, three different blade thicknesses were used. Figure 49 summarizes 
the different blades which were used for the experiments of D.W. Taylor [95].  
 
Figure 49.   Sets of Blades Used by D.W. Taylor for the Experiments (From [95]) 
Based on D.W. Taylor’s experimental results, J.H. Biles [95] notes that,  
The results obtained show clearly that there is a falling off in efficiency 
with an increase of blade thickness, and that such increase causes a 
marked increment in the power absorbed and thrust delivered. It seems to 
be a fair conclusion that, if the type of blade section remains constant, any 
increase of blade thickness will cause a loss of efficiency....  
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Simply, increasing the blade thickness causes a loss in propeller 
efficiency. Figure 50 shows the loss of efficiency due to the increase of blade thickness 
fraction (ratio) [95].  
 
Figure 50.   Efficiency vs. Blade Thickness Fraction (From [95]) 
Case 2 (propeller diameter=2.5 m and propeller speed=150 RPM) is used 
to find the estimated loss of efficiency for the sample ship’s propeller. The blade 
thickness fraction is 0.032896 for the initial calculations of efficiency by OpenProp 
v2.4.6. Figure 52 shows the blade thickness of this initial blade thickness fraction (ratio).   
 D  = 2.5 m. 
 to / D  = 0.032896  
 to  = 0.08224 m. 
It is assumed (1) the ropes or nets are wrapped around the propeller blades 
uniformly, and (2) there are 5 cm. thick ropes or nets on each side of the blade after 
wrapping. Therefore, the total thickness of the wrapped ropes or nets is 10 cm. As a 
result, the blade thickness fraction becomes 0.072896. Table 17 shows the calculation of 
the blade thickness ratio after wrapping.  
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Because the OpenProp v2.4.6 does not include blade thickness in 
performance calculations (efficiency stays the same after a change of thickness) [96], the 
software is only used to demonstrate the blade thickness profiles before and after 
wrapping.   
 
















0.2 0.032896 2.5 0.08224 0.1 0.18224 0.072896 
0.3 0.028197 2.5 0.07049 0.1 0.17049 0.068197 
0.4 0.023903 2.5 0.05976 0.1 0.15976 0.063903 
0.5 0.019808 2.5 0.04952 0.1 0.14952 0.059808 
0.6 0.015997 2.5 0.03999 0.1 0.13999 0.055997 
0.7 0.012503 2.5 0.03126 0.1 0.13126 0.052503 
0.8 0.009105 2.5 0.02276 0.1 0.12276 0.049105 
0.9 0.005996 2.5 0.01499 0.1 0.11499 0.045996 
0.95 0.004494 2.5 0.01123 0.1 0.11123 0.044494 
1.0 0.000010 2.5 0.00003 0.1 0.10003 0.040010 
 
Table 17.   Calculation of Blade Thickness Fraction after Wrapping 
 87
 
Figure 52.   Blade Thickness of Case 2 after Wrapping  
The hub diameter is assumed constant during the wrapping. Therefore, the 
experimental results of D.W. Taylor can be used to calculate the loss of efficiency after 
wrapping. The blade thickness fraction ratio is: 
 to / D = 0.072896 (after wrapping) 
 to / D = 0.032896 (before wrapping) 
 Ratio = 2.216 
Based on the difference of the blade thickness fraction after wrapping, 
using Figure 50 yields these results: 
 For pitch ratio=1.2, efficiency decreases from approximately 77% to 68% 
 For pitch ratio=0.6, efficiency decreases from approximately 62% to 55% 
Finally, there is an average of 8% loss of efficiency because of the 10 cm. 
increase in the design blade thickness after wrapping.  
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c. Increasing the Blade Area 
Experimental results are considered to demonstrate the loss of propeller 
efficiency caused by increasing the blade area after wrapping. D.W. Taylor used 
120 blades to analyze the effects of blade area, thickness and pitch ratio on efficiency. In 
the experiments, three-bladed propellers with 0.4 m (16 inches) diameter were used. 
There were six pitch ratios (0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.5, 2.0) with five different blade areas for 
each pitch ratio. The mean width ratios of the blades were 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30 and 0.35. 
The thicknesses of the blades were reduced (from original cut to A-, B- and C-cut) after 
each experiment. Four different thicknesses were used for each propeller, and 
120 different propellers were analyzed totally. [97], [98] 
 
Figure 53.   Blade Mean Width Ratios (From [98])  
Similar to the effects of increasing blade thickness, an increase of the 
blade area causes the loss of efficiency. In conclusion, there is 5% to 10% decrease of 




Table 18.   Propellers Used in Taylor’s Experiments (From [98]) 
Table 18 shows the properties of the 120 propellers used by Taylor, and 




Figure 54.   Effects of Blade Area and Thickness on Efficiency (From [98])  
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d. Increasing the Roughness (Blade Surface Friction) 
As mentioned before, it is assumed that the ropes or nets become part of 
the blades after wrapping. Because of the difference in material properties, the roughness 
of the blades will be increased after wrapping. Experimental results are considered to 
demonstrate the loss of propeller efficiency caused by increase in blade roughness. 
Based on the works of W. McEntee [99], D.W. Taylor mentions, 
Probably no controllable feature of a propeller designed to meet given 
conditions has as much influence upon efficiency as the nature and 
condition of its surface…. There seems good reason to believe that the 
efficiency of new cast iron or steel propellers, or bronze propellers in 
moderately good (not bad) condition, is generally some 10 percent below 
that of new accurately finished bronze propellers made as smooth as 
possible. In other words, the vast majority of existing ships are probably 
operating with an avoidable waste of power of the order of 10 percent 
[93]. 
Figures 55 and Figure 56 show the negative effect of roughness on 
propeller efficiency. 
 
Figure 55.   Effects of Roughness on Efficiency (From [93])  
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Figure 56.   Efficiency Loss due to Roughness (From [93]) 
It is obvious that the negative effect of wrapped ropes and nets on 
propeller efficiency is greater than the effect of natural roughness. Based on the Figures 
55 and Figure 56, it is assumed that there will be a minimum 30% loss of efficiency due 
to the increased roughness (blade surface friction) after wrapping.   
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e. Other Factors 
There are other factors that cause the loss of efficiency and/or increase of 
resistance. Simply, the wrapped ropes or nets will cause: 
 Increase of the appendage resistance, 
 Increase of the total weight of the ship (so required thrust increases), 
 A decrease in the quality of the flow around the propeller, 
 Friction on shaft (loss in shaft efficiency). 
f. Using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) for Calculating the 
Loss of Efficiency after Wrapping 
The OpenProp v2.4.6 creates an output file which has all the geometrical 
information of the designed propeller blade. Using this file, it is easy to create a solid 
blade in SolidWorks software. Figure 57 shows the curves of the blade for Case-2 which 
are created in SolidWorks by using coordinates provided by OpenProp v2.4.6. 
 
Figure 57.   Geometry of the Propeller Blade for Case 2 
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Figure 58 shows the solid blade created in SolidWorks after selection of 
the blade’s material. 
 
Figure 58.   Solid Blade after Material Selection for Case 2 
After creating the solid blade in SolidWorks, the blade can be opened with 
the ANSYS software. Figure 59 shows the solid blade opened in ANSYS. Both in 
SolidWorks and in ANSYS, the whole propeller and the ropes or nets wrapped around 
the propeller can be drawn. After that, the flow around the propeller and wrapped ropes 
or nets can be defined in ANSYS. In this way, the wrapping can be simulated, and the 
propeller efficiency after wrapping can be calculated using the CFD codes of ANSYS.  
In conclusion, there are computational methods for calculating the loss of 
propeller efficiency after wrapping. However, because of the random nature of the 
wrapping, different wrapping patterns must be created to compare the results. In this 
research, the CFD method is not used because of time limitations.  
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Figure 59.   Solid Blade in ANSYS for Case 2 
g. Summary of the Efficiency Analysis after Wrapping 
The effects of wrapping ropes or nets around the propeller and its hub 
were analyzed. These are the main results of the efficiency analysis after wrapping: 
 If the wrapped diameter of the hub reaches three-fourths of the diameter of 
the propeller, the loss of efficiency will be greater than approximately 
50%.  
 There is an average of 8% loss of efficiency because of the 10 cm. 
increase of the design blade thickness after wrapping. 
 There will be a minimum 30% loss of efficiency due to the increased 
roughness (blade surface friction) after wrapping. 
 There will be 5% to 10% decrease of efficiency based on the increase of 
design blade area. 
  There are other factors, such as increase of appendage resistance and 
friction on the shaft, that reduce efficiency.  
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Based on these results, it is possible to stop a ship by successfully 
wrapping ropes or nets around the propeller and its hub. Even if the propeller of the ship 
continues to turn after wrapping, the loss of efficiency will exceed 90%. For the most 
probable scenario, the efficiency of the sample ship’s designed propeller will be impeded 
after the successful wrapping.  
The sample ship has an average speed of 9.1 knots and a maximum speed 
of 10.5 knots based on information from AIS [81]. The sample ship voyages from north 
to south, and the average current in the northern entrance of the Istanbul Strait is 1 knot 
[15]. As mentioned before, there is a speed limit regulation in the Turkish Straits. Based 
on Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Turkish Straits (Article 13), the vessels within 
the straits may not cruise at a speed more than 10 knots over the ground [73].   
As mentioned before, the propeller efficiency is one of the factors of the 
overall propulsive efficiency [91, 92].  
ηH: Hull efficiency 
ηB: Propeller efficiency behind the ship   
ηS: Shaft transmission efficiency  
ηP: Overall propulsive efficiency  
ηP = ηH x ηB x ηS  
Therefore, the speed of the sample ship will be approximately 1 knot after 
the successful wrapping. Together with the average current, the maximum speed of the 
sample ship will be approximately 2 knots. The underwater system must be designed 
based on this criterion. 
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VII. DESIGN OF THE UNDERWATER SYSTEM  
Computational and experimental results demonstrate that the loss of efficiency 
will be greater than 90% after successful wrapping. With the average current at the 
northern entrance of the Istanbul Strait, the speed of the sample ship will be 
approximately 2 knots. Based on this information, the design criteria are: 
 The underwater system must be designed to wrap the ropes or nets around 
terrorist ship’s propeller and its hub successfully, and… 
 The underwater system must hold the ship like an anchor after wrapping. 
 
Figure 60.   Sketch of the Underwater System and the Stopped Ship 
The Google SketchUp 8 software is used to draw the underwater system [100]. 
The software has an internet based model bank named “Google 3D Warehouse.” The ship 
model in the drawings is selected from this warehouse [89].  
The working principle of the underwater system is based on the acoustic radiation 
of the propeller. Sensors detect the source of noise (the propeller of the ship), and UUVs 
will carry and throw ropes and nets to the source. The underwater system is designed to 
stop the sample ship, which has one propeller.   
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To meet design criteria, the underwater system must consist of components such 
as the UUVs, a command and control station, acoustic sensors, an artificial reef, 
waterproof tank(s), and ropes and nets to wrap around the propeller. The functions of 
these elements are described in this chapter. Power requirements, weight and strength 
calculations, acoustics, underwater positioning methods, the wrapping mechanism and 
the material selection of the underwater system are outside the scope of this research. 
A. COMPONENTS OF THE UNDERWATER SYSTEM 
These are the main components of the underwater system: 
 Artificial reef 
 Waterproof tank(s) 
 Ropes and Nets 
 UUVs 
 Sound navigation and ranging (SONAR) 
 Command and control station  
1. Artificial Reef  
The underwater system needs a component on the bottom of the sea that acts like 
an anchor to hold the ship after wrapping. One end of the wrapped ropes and nets must 
connect to this underwater structure. This structure must be heavy enough to hold the 
ship securely. For the most probable scenario, the structure must be placed in the northern 
entrance of the Istanbul Strait to stop the sample ship. Figure 61 shows the location of the 
structure [101]. The closest distance between the shore and the structure is 1,100 meters 
[102], and the depth is about 77 meters [101]. 
Artificial reefs have been in use for hundreds of years providing habitat for fish 
and other marine life. These man-made structures are generally made of concrete,  
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limestone, steel and plastic. In summary, the underwater structure can be designed as an 
artificial reef and may serve as a home to fish for long years, contributing to a sustainable 
fishing industry. 
 
Figure 61.   Location of the Underwater System (After [101]) 
    
Figure 62.   Examples of Artificial Reefs (From [103], [104]) 
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2. Waterproof Tank 
The underwater system needs waterproof tank or tanks in order to store the UUVs 
and ropes and nets. These tanks may also contain other elements based on the details of 
its design. As the depth of the artificial reef is about 77 meters [101], underwater pressure 
is not so high, so it is possible to place waterproof tanks on the bottom of the sea. The 
tanks must be located on the artificial reef. Accordingly, the tanks are higher than the sea 
bottom and not covered with sand, and at the same time they are stable because of the 
weight of the artificial reef. 
 
Figure 63.   Sketch of the Waterproof Tank Placed on the Artificial Reef  
3. Ropes and Nets  
The underwater system uses ropes and nets to wrap around a propeller and its 
hub. There are two constraints in the selection of the ropes and nets even though these 
constraints do not exist in the sample ship used in this study. 
First, products exist called “rope/line/net cutters,” located between the propeller 
and the shaft and used to cut ropes, lines, and nets wrapped around the propeller [83]. 
Though these cutters are not commonly in use, their effects must be considered. 
Second, ducted propellers (also known as Kort Nozzles) are in use to increase the 
efficiency of heavily loaded propellers [105]. Their design may affect the selection of the 
ropes and nets.  
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Figure 64.   Examples of a Rope Cutter and a Ducted Propeller (From [106], [107]) 
It is easier to wrap nets around the propeller and hub than ropes because the nets 
are lighter and cover a wider area. The UUVs throw the nets, which are connected to 
ropes, and the nets wrap around the propeller and hub first. The ropes will be wrapped 
later as the shaft and propeller rotate. Small plastic floats can be used to increase the 
buoyancy of the ropes and nets, minimizing the power required for the UUVs. In all 
cases, the material selections of the ropes and nets are critical: high elasticity and 
toughness are required. The selection of the specific material is outside of the scope of 
this research. 
 
Figure 65.   Examples of Rope and Net with Small Plastic Floats (From [108], [109]) 
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The system is designed to reduce the tension in the ropes after wrapping. If the 
wrapping begins before the ship passes above the artificial reef, it will be possible to 
complete wrapping and impede the propeller efficiency without applying excessive 
tension in ropes. The underwater system contains tensiometers for measuring the tension 
of the ropes. The ropes continuously will be released from the waterproof tank until the 
tension gets in the working limits of the ropes. Then the ropes will hold the ship like an 
anchor chain. As calculated in Chapter VI, and accounting for average current speed, the 
maximum speed of the sample ship will be approximately 2 knots after successful 
wrapping. In conclusion, the maximum tension in the ropes will occur when the wrapping 
is complete and the ship has reduced speed.  
 
Figure 66.   Minimizing the Tension in Ropes by Earlier Wrapping  
4. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles 
The underwater system needs UUVs to carry and throw the ropes and nets. There 
are two UUVs in this design, each of which has a mechanism for throwing ropes and 
nets. One of the UUVs throws the ropes and nets to the shaft and propeller hub while the 
other throws them to the propeller. The throwing time can be adjusted based on analyses 
of the propeller’s acoustic radiation. As mentioned above, the U.S. Coast Guard uses a 
system for stopping a small boat’s propeller called a boat trap [41], the principle of which 
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is using ballistic nets dropped from a helicopter. The nets wrap around the propeller of 
the terrorist boat. The ballistic mechanism of the boat trap is activated before it hits the 
sea surface, so that the nets cover a wide area. The system was tested so many times in 
2005, stopping 100% of small boat targets [40]. The throwing mechanism of the UUVs in 
this study can be designed similar to the boat trap. 
The UUVs must have a system to track the position of the propeller. Therefore, 
there is need for sonar devices and sonar data processing. Sonar can be located in the 
UUVs or the UUVs can be guided with an underwater positioning, sensing, command 
and control system. Using sonar the UUVs get close to the terrorist ship, launch the ropes 
and nets at the propeller, and then retreat from the propeller. In all these steps, the UUVs 
use batteries for power supply. In the design, a cable line from a land-based power station 
to the waterproof tank keeps the batteries of the UUVs fully charged. 
 
Figure 67.   REMUS 6000 Equipped with Sonar (From [110]) 
5. Sonar  
The underwater system needs sonar to detect, classify, localize and track the 
propeller of the terrorist ship. The word sonar comes from “SOund NAvigation and 
Ranging.” R.P. Hodges [111] reports: 
The operation of sonar is based on the propagation of waves between a 
target and a receiver. The two most common types of sonar systems are 
passive and active. In a passive sonar system, energy originates at a target 
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and propagates to a receiver, analogous to passive infrared detection. In an 
active sonar system, waves propagate from a transmitter to a target and 
back to receiver, analogous to pulse-echo radar…. The noise radiated from 
propellers is different from internal machinery noise in that it is outside 
the ship and in direct contact with the medium.  
R.D. Collier [112] reports: 
The four principal groups of radiated noise sources are (1) machinery 
vibration caused by propulsion machinery and ship’s services and 
auxiliary machinery, including steam, water, and hydraulic piping 
systems; (2) propellers, jets, and other forms of in-water propulsion; (3) 
acoustic noise within compartments below waterline; and (4) 
hydroacoustic noise generated external to the hull by flow interaction with 
appendages, cavities, and other discontinuities.”  
All of these sources have different frequencies in noise spectra.  
The propeller noise can be divided into two groups, cavitating and noncavitating. 
D.T. Blackstock and M.J. Crocker [113] report,  
Cavitation can occur in fluids because of variety of causes, one of which is 
acoustic excitation. If sufficiently intense sound fields are created in a 
liquid, then cavitation can occur during the low-pressure phase of the 
pressure fluctuations when bubbles are produced. Strong noise occurs 
during acoustic cavitation. It is caused by the cavities or bubbles which are 
generated and set into oscillation in the sound field.   
R.D. Collier [112] reports:  
There are three types of noncavitating propeller noise: (a) mechanical 
blade tonals related to propeller shaft speed and the number of blades; (b) 
propeller broadband noise related to blade vibratory response to 
turbulence ingestation and trailing-edge vortices; (c) propeller singing due 
to coincidence of vortex shedding and blade resonant frequencies. 
In conclusion, the working principle of the underwater system is based on 
tracking propeller noise, and it is possible to detect, classify, localize and track propeller 
noise by using sonar. In the design, there is a network of active and passive sonars.    
6. Command and Control Station  
There must be a land-based command and control station to activate and control 
the underwater system via underwater positioning, communication, sonar data 
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processing. This station also provides power to the waterproof tanks and the batteries of 
the UUVs by cables. The station must be employed under the authority of the Turkish 
Coast Guard Command.  
B. PROBABLE MOTIONS OF THE SHIP AFTER WRAPPING 
It is not possible to understand the exact motions of the ship after successful 
wrapping because of the random nature of the wrapping. On the other hand, it is possible 
to make some estimation based on assumptions. 
1. Assumptions  
a. The Loss of Efficiency Assumptions 
In Chapter VI, three different cases were used to demonstrate the loss of 
efficiency caused by the increase in hub diameter. In this chapter, Case 2 is selected to 
estimate the motions. Here is the list of the assumptions based on the calculations in 
Chapter VI.  
 The propeller diameter: 2.5 meters 
 The initial hub diameter: 0.4 meters 
 Rotation speed:  150 rpm  
 The diameter of the hub will be at least three-fourths of the propeller 
diameter at end of the wrapping. Therefore, the loss of efficiency will be 
50%, caused by the increase in hub diameter. 
 There will be 45% loss of efficiency because of the increase in the design 
blade thickness, blade area, roughness, appendage resistance and other 
effects of wrapping. 
 The total loss of efficiency will be 95% after wrapping, 50% from the 
increase of hub diameter and 45% from changes in the blade thickness, 
area, and roughness, as well as other effects. 
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 Because of the random nature of the wrapping, it is assumed that the loss 
of efficiency caused by changes in the blade thickness, area, and 
roughness as well as other effects are linearly proportional to the loss of 
efficiency caused by increase of hub diameter. 
b. Increase of Hub Diameter Assumptions 
Here is the list of the assumptions about the increase of hub diameter:  
 The diameter of the hub will be 1.88 m (¾ of the propeller diameter) after 
wrapping. 
 There is a 1-meter-long clearance between the propeller and the ship’s 
hull. Therefore, the rope will be wrapped around this 1-meter-long 
shaft/hub. 
 In normal cases, the wrapped rope will be closer to the propeller, away 
from the ship’s hull, because of the forward motion of the ship. In this 
calculation, the wrapping of the rope around the propeller hub/shaft (1-
meter-long clearance) is assumed to be rectangular pattern (when viewed 
from the port/starboard side, the wrapped-rope has a rectangular cross-
sectional area). This is the worst-case scenario because in this case it will 
take a longer time to increase the hub diameter. For example, if the 
diameter of the rope is 5 cm, the propeller/shaft must rotate 20 cycles to 
cover the first row of the 1-meter-long clearance, after which the wrapping 
of the second row will begin, and the hub radius will increase 5 cm more. 
This process continues until the ship stops. 
 There will be no decrease in the diameter of the rope during wrapping 
because of compression/squeezing. 
 The volume of small plastic floats, used to increase the buoyancy of the 
ropes and nets, is ignored. 
 First, the nets will be wrapped; the ropes will begin to wrap 5 seconds 
later. 
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c. Other Assumptions 
 The rotation speed of the shaft will be constant during wrapping. 
 The motion of the ship will always be in the forward direction. The course 
of the ship will not change during wrapping. 
 The ropes will not be deformed during wrapping or at the time of 
stopping. 
 The weight of the artificial reef is enough stop and hold the ship.  
 The ropes continuously will be released from the waterproof tank until the 
tension gets in the working limits of the ropes.  
2. Results 
Four different rope diameters (3, 4, 5 and 6 cm) are selected for the motion 
calculations. Based on the above assumptions, the distance traveled and the changes in 
speed of the ship are calculated. Figure 68 demonstrates the relation between the rope 
diameter and the distance traveled. These are the traveled distances of the ship until the 
efficiency loss becomes 95%. After this point, the ship will continue to cruise until the 
releasing of the ropes is stopped, e.g., when the tension in ropes gets in the working 
limits. Therefore, the total stopping distance (not calculated) of the ship will be greater. 
 
Figure 68.   Traveled Distance of the Ship for 95% Loss of Efficiency 
 108
In this design, the selected rope diameter is 5 cm. Figure 69 shows the total 
traveled distance (470 meters) for 95% loss of efficiency for the 5 cm rope diameter. 
 
Figure 69.   Traveled Distance of the Ship for 5 cm Rope Diameter 
 
Figure 70.   System’s Geographical Summary for 5 cm Rope Diameter (After [102])  
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These graphs show the change of speed, based on the thrust produced, during 
wrapping with the 5-cm-diameter rope: 
 
Figure 71.   Change of Speed (m/s) for 5-cm-diameter Rope 
 
Figure 72.   Change of Speed (knots) for 5-cm-diameter Rope  
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C. SKETCHES OF THE UNDERWATER SYSTEM FOR THE MOST 
PROBABLE SCENARIO 
 
Figure 73.   The LPG tanker under the control of terrorists is cruising towards the 
northern entrance of the Istanbul Strait, and the command and control station 
is ready to activate the underwater system. 
 
Figure 74.   The underwater system is activated, the waterproof tank is opened and the 
UUVs are released. The UUVs carry the ropes and nets to the propeller of the 
ship using sonar data. 
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Figure 75.   The UUVs are ready to throw the nets using the launching mechanism. 
 
Figure 76.   The UUVs launch the nets, are released from the ropes and retreat from 
the propeller. The ropes are about to wrap around the propeller and its hub.  
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Figure 77.   The ropes are wrapped, and the UUVs are away from the propeller. 
Propeller efficiency begins to decrease.  
 
Figure 78.   The propeller efficiency continues to decrease, and the ship slows down.  
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Figure 79.   The speed of the ship is approximately 2 knots, and artificial reef holds the 
ship like an anchor. There is no excess tension in the ropes. The terrorist ship 
is stopped before entering the Istanbul strait. 
 
 
Figure 80.   A sketch of the underwater system after successful wrapping 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This research demonstrated that the security of the Turkish Straits against 
maritime terrorism can be increased by designing an underwater system that can stop a 
terrorist ship by impeding its propeller efficiency. Protecting the Turkish Straits is an 
important security problem that must be solved because they are highly vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks. It is relatively easy to execute a terrorist attack in the straits because of 
the intense maritime traffic, narrow geographical configurations and high population 
density. Terrorists do not need a high amount of explosives because the cargo of 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and other chemical 
carrying ships is itself highly explosive. An explosion in the straits may cause the loss of 
thousands of lives, an environmental catastrophe, closure of the straits for navigation and 
an economic crisis.  
First, the most probable scenario from the point of view of a terrorist organization 
was determined based on the information and analysis in Chapters II, III, IV and V. 
According to this analysis, the most likely scenario is a conspiracy of crew members 
aboard an LPG carrier, using a vessel in the Istanbul Strait to carry out a terrorist attack. 
Second, all the existing and some non-existent methods to prevent this scenario 
were analyzed; Table 6 shows these 20 methods. Table 13 summarizes that existing 
methods currently provide no absolute protection against the most probable scenario. 
Therefore, a new system was designed after studying currently non-existent methods. 
Based on the analysis in Chapter VI, the most applicable and feasible non-existent 
method was selected. The method of protection selected was stopping the propeller. 
Finally, an underwater system was designed to impede the propeller efficiency of 
a ship by wrapping ropes and nets around the propeller and its hub, stopping the ship 
before entering the strait. These factors would decrease the propeller’s efficiency and 
increase resistance after wrapping: 
 An increase in the hub diameter, 
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 An increase in the thickness of the blades (blade thickness fraction), 
 An increase in the blade area, 
 An increase in the roughness (surface friction of the blades) and 
 Other effects, for example increased appendage resistance, friction on 
shaft and change in the flow characteristics. 
Computational methods (OpenProp v2.4.6) and experimental results of previous 
researchers were used to demonstrate the loss of propeller efficiency after wrapping. The 
results in Chapter VI demonstrate that the loss of efficiency will be greater than 90% 
after successful wrapping. Calculations of “efficiency loss” and “probable motions of the 
ship after wrapping” show that it is possible to stop the terrorist ship before entering the 
strait.  
The working principle of the underwater system was based on tracking the 
acoustic radiation of the propeller. The main components of the underwater system are an 
artificial reef, waterproof tank(s), ropes and nets, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), 
sound navigation and ranging (SONAR) and a command and control station.  
With such an underwater system, it is possible to stop the terrorist ship before it 
enters the straits and prevent further damage it may cause. The underwater system will 
provide an alternative and non-lethal solution in addition to existing methods. It may 
serve as a deterrent to terrorists, forcing them to change their plans. The underwater 
system also can be used to protect shore facilities and harbors against maritime terrorism. 
Finally, it can be used in wartime scenarios against enemy warships. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research demonstrated that there is no absolute protection against the most 
probable maritime terrorism scenario using currently existing methods and aimed to 
design a new system to increase the security of the Turkish Straits. Chapters II, III, IV 
and V sought to answer the questions of “why” and “what” is needed. Therefore, only 
Chapters VI and VII studied “how” the new system would work. Time constraints of this 
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research limited studying the details of the underwater system, such as the effects of 
wrapping patterns, power requirements, acoustics and the material selection.    
Because there was no opportunity to conduct experiments in this research, 
OpenProp v2.4.6 software was used to calculate the efficiency loss due to the increase of 
hub diameter after wrapping. The efficiency loss caused by the other factors (i.e., an 
increase of the propeller blade thickness, blade area, roughness and appendage resistance) 
can also be calculated using computational methods despite the random nature of the 
wrapping. However, because of time limitations, a computational method was not used to 
calculate the efficiency loss due to these factors.  
The OpenProp v2.4.6 creates an output file that has all the geometrical 
information of the designed propeller blade. Using this file, it is easy to create a solid 
blade in SolidWorks software. After creating of the solid blade in SolidWorks, the blade 
can be opened with the ANSYS software. Figures 57, 58 and 59 show these steps. Both 
in SolidWorks and in ANSYS, the whole propeller and the ropes or nets wrapped around 
the propeller can be drawn. After that, the flow around the propeller and wrapped ropes 
or nets can be defined in ANSYS. In this way, the wrapping can be simulated, and the 
propeller efficiency after wrapping can be calculated using the CFD codes of ANSYS. 
However, because of the random nature of the wrapping, different wrapping patterns 
must be created to compare the results. In this research, the CFD method was not used 
because of time limitations. For further studies, it is recommended that computational 
methods be used to understand the effects of wrapping on efficiency loss.  
This research described the working principle, main components and functions of 
the underwater system. The power requirements, weight and strength calculations, 
acoustics, underwater positioning methods, wrapping mechanism and the material 
selection were not studied because of time limitations. Further studies in these areas are 
recommended to complete the detailed design. 
Currently, there is no LNG carrier ship traffic in the Istanbul Strait. Therefore, an 
LPG carrier ship was selected as the target ship in the most probable scenario. However, 
a typical LNG carrier ship’s cargo is 10 to 15 times larger than a typical LPG carrier 
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ship’s cargo, so the damaging effect of an LNG carrier ship explosion would be much 
greater than that of a LPG carrier. In the future, LNG terminals may be built in the Black 
Sea region, and there may be LNG carrier ship traffic in the Istanbul Strait. In this case, 
the most probable scenario will change. It should be noted that the different 
characteristics of LNG carrier ships may affect details in the design of the underwater 
system.  
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